In their bearing on the subject under consideration the resources of
Spain may be divided into three divisions — her fighting power, her gov-
ernment machinery or system of government, and her racial influence.
Her fighting power includes all the forces of the army and navy
which she could bring to bear on Sulu and her ability to support them.
The largest Spanish force that ever assembled on the soil of Sulu was
that commanded by Governor-General Malcampo in the expedition of
187G; this was estimated at from 9,000 to 11,000 troops. In January,
1888, the military forces of the Philippine Islands numbered 12,800 men,
of whom 1,400 were Spaniards and the rest natives. Governor Arolas
never commanded more than 2,000 troops in his various expeditions and
never needed more than that number. A garrison force of 700 men
proved sufficient to repulse a general attack on Jolo in 1881. We may
therefore safely conclude that a force of 2,000 native troops stationed in
Sulu was suflBcient for all purposes and considerations. Such a force
should have been kept in Sulu all the time. The moral effect of maintain-
ing it would be to suppress any attempt at opposition and to check the
tendency to mischief or rebellion. The fact that there is a ready force
behind an order or recjuest prompts obedience and conformity, before
deceit or plots can have time to grow. Wise measures are more effective
and peace is assured. Besides, the honor of the sovereign power is con-
stantly maintained and no chances for disregard or dishonor are allowed.
Force back of a wise administrator is a potent factor for good. It need
not be used except rarely and when absolutely necessary. Force is evil
only when it is allowed to rule the head of the administrator and, like
every other agency, it is good only when it is wisely direc^ted. It was
therefore necessary and, in as far as it was needed to back a competent
administration, it should have been provided. Spain could have easily
kept such a force in Sulu all of the time. She had the troops and the
means to support them. She, however, did not do this, and only part
of the time did the Sulu garrison have the required strength. However,
the facility of transporting troops from Zamboanga to Jolo and the
preponderance of her naval forces reduced this deficiency to a minimum
and the fighting power of Spain may, as far as our purpose is concerned,
be deemed to have been adequate to rule Sulu.
The chief weakness in the Spanish regime lay in her system of govern-
ment. Her government macliinery proved ineffective and inadequate.
No competent men were educated into the needs of the situation and
given permanent charge of Sulu affairs. Temporary military com-
manders were put in command without the necessary preparation for the
requirements of the oflBce. No special ability was needed to conduct an
office already organized, to execute laws already established, or to carry
out a system of government already laid out; but it required higher
abilities to establish sovereignty over a new state like Sulu, lay down a
definite, settled, and wise policy, and carry out the regeneration and
reform of a nation. Besides too frequent changes in the office of Gov-
ernor-General, the governors of Sulu were also allowed too short terms.
More than thirteen governors ruled Sulu in the course of twenty-three
years, from 1876 to 1899. Not one of these felt that it was his duty to
institute a permanent policy for Sulu,. or believed that he was going to
stay long enough to carry it through, and that he was going to be held
responsible for its conduct, whether it failed or succeeded.
The government of a state is entitled to as much consideration as
any business undertaking and there is no reason why it should not
be conducted on sound and businesslike principles. Such methods as
characterized the government of Sulu would have ruined any business
establishment and could not have done justice to any nation or body of
men it represented. The men in responsible positions trusted the trans-
mission of all official actions and communications to interpreters of
limited capacity and strength of character. No governor could speak
Sulu and verify the translation of his letters and orders. His knowledge
of Sulu affairs and his ideas and opinions were necessarily colored by the
opinions or designs of his interpreters. The strength of Spain's asser-
tion and declaration of her rights to rule Sulu, exclude foreign interests,
appoint the Sultan of Sulu, and impose tribute on the Sulus was based
on the meaning of the word "sovereignty" which does not appear at all
in the Sulu text of the treaty of 1878. The Sulu copy of the treaty
uses in this connection the word ''agad/' which means "follow.'' In the
translation of this document from Sulu into English a point was
stretched and "agad" was interpreted as "obey." Wliile the Sultans of
Sulu felt that they were independent and free in their administration of
Sulu internal affairs, and that they were only obliged to give Spain prefer-
ence, and ally themselves on her side when foreign nations interfered,
governors like Arolas read the word "sovereignty" in the Spanish text and
tried to inforce its full and actual sense. The Sulus felt that the
Spanish governors were thus transgressing tlic limits of their authority,
and the Spanish governors thought at the same time that the Sulus were
unreliable and deceitful, a most undesirable and unfortunate condition
of affairs.
The missionaries in the northern islands acted differently. They
talked the language of the natives and performed their duties creditably and with unquestionable success. They understood the people, knew
their real conditions, sympathized with them, and worked out their
religious regeneration admirably. The governors of Sulu did not take
any such view of their duties ; they had some zeal, but they lacked that
understanding of human nature and the forces of regeneration that
tiie missionaries mastered. They had no idea of how a Sulu law or
custom could be modified and refonned, for they never acquainted them-
selves sufficiently with the laws and customs of the people and never
paid much attention to the feelings and public opinion of the Sulus.
They trusted every measure to force and could not think of reform with-
out compulsion. A missionary who observed the intense fear of demons
on the part of some pagan Filipinos converted several of them by means
of a picture of hell and satan, and gradually taught them the principles
of Christianity. But the governors of Sulu could never detect any
relation between Sulu and Spanisli laws and could never find a method
of approa<?h from one side to the other. Their form of government
failed to adapt itself to the conditions of the country and could neither
merge into the Sulu organization nor adapt the Sulu organization to its
system. No sympathies bound the two races or the two organizations,
and no foundation for unification and subsequent assimilation could be
laid. Spanish jurisdiction remained within the garrison, and its machi-
nery could find no application outside the walls of Jolo.
The amount of force needed to reduce and reform Sulu varies in
accordance with the policy pursued. Considerable light can be thrown
on this subject by a study of the circumstances and causes which gave
rise to Datus Ayunan, Mandi, Piang, Ara, and Pedro Cuevas or Kalun.
Datu Ayunan lived at Taviran and was much lower in rank and in-
fluence than either the Sultan of Bagumbayan or Datu Utu. Slaving
grievances against Datu Utu he shrewdly allied himself with the Spanisli
forces and rendered them valuable assistance. In a short time he rose
to power, dignity, and fame and died greater in the estimation of the
country than his overlord, the Sultan of Bagumbayan.
Datu Piang married the daughter of Datu Ayunan and learned his
methods. As soon as Datu Utu's . attitude toward him became unbear-
able and hostile be offered his services to the Spanish authorities and
won their protection and support. By shrewd tactics he dispossessed
liis former master Utu of his best lands, attracted most of his following
and caused his downfall. At tlie time of the Spanish evacuation he
had become the richest Moro in Mindanao and the most influential chief
in the island.
Datu Ara had C'hinese blood in him. He married his daughter to the
Gugu^ of Magindanao, won the favor of the governor of Kotabato, and
ruled over all Moros on the southern branch of the Mindanao River below
Tamontaka. He was strong and well respected.
Datu Mandi married the daughter of a Samal chief of Zamboanga
and through his tact and ability to speak Spanish established for himself
a respectable position over the Samals of Mindanao. He served the
interests of Spain faitlifully and bore arms in her behalf against Bisa-
yans and Lanao Moros. The recognition and support he obtained from
the Spanish Government raised him to the rank of a datu and gave him
supremacy over all the chiefs of the peninsula of Zamboanga. A close
observation of Datu Mandi's ability and attitude toward the government
renders it clear that the influence this man could bring to bear on his
people was immense. It is no exageration to state that had his in-
fluence been tactfully utilized, he could have easily, with the aid of
one company of Spanish troops, reduced to submission all Moros and
Subanuns living between Point Flechas and Sindangan on the outskirts
of Dapitan. There never existed a Moro chief more tactful, pliable,
forceful, and favorable to the reorganization of the Moro community
and its system of goveniment along modem and civilized lines.
With little aid from the governor of Zamboanga, Pedro Cuevas made
himself the real lord of northern Basilan. His power was further well
respected throughout all the Basilan Group of islands. With no more
than two companies of troops at his disposal he could have acted as the
Spanish representative and subordinate ruler or governor of all tlie
Basilan and Balangingi Groups of islands and could have effected any
reform desired.
By tact and ability these men obtained Spanish influence and support
and rose from the lowest ranks of the people to positions of great power
and dignity. Had the Spanish Government employed such men to
further its influence by enlarging their following and extending tlieir
territories and spheres of activity, there is no doubt that a very significant
step would have been taken which would have made clear to the Spanish
authorities successful methods of procedure and new lines of policy that
lead to success.
Similar lines of action could have been adopted in Sulu by taking
advantage of existing parties and factions. Once the sympathy of one
Sulu party was obtained and its forces bore arms on behalf of or on
the same side with Spain, the door would have been opened for effective
influence and wise measures directed along the line of cleavage would
have been bound to produce results. A minimum of force would then
be needed, and strained relations and discord would give way to friend-
ship and concord. The history of Sulu is not wanting in proof that
wise attractive methods liave been more effective than force and arbitrar}^
rule, and, once we reflect upon Abu Baki-'s rule and the wonderful
reformation he worked out, then we realize what was and what was not
a wise policy for Sulu.
Little attention lias, as a rule, been given to race ('haraeleristies jvs
a potent factor in a nation's policy. The racial character of the sovereign
nation bears on the ruled nation in several ways — in the conduct and
demeanor of officials in their official and social relations with the chiefs
and common people, in the demeanor of soldiers and civilians in their
social intercourse with the mass of the people, and in the industrial or
business relations of the two nations.
The Sulu datus and chiefs are very courteous and polite and are
unusually keen to notice personal discourtesy. Impulsive and uncon-
ciliatory methods are bitterly resented, and an abrupt manner may in
itself be sufficient to defeat any measure. The people in general have
no patience with an impetuous officer and hate to be discourteously
treated even by their datus. Treated with disrespect by the authorities
or disregarded by the ruling race, they become exclusive, evasive, indif-
ferent, unsympathetic, and discontented. The ruling race can be polite,
courteous, and civil in all its social relations with those under it and
yet retain its racial supremacy and social position, and win the respect
and submission of the ruled race. If ordinary civil duties require good
breeding and good manners, the duties of the Spanish officer toward the
native chiefs certainly demanded the highest qualities of a gentleman
and the most sympathetic, upright, and firm disposition possible. Many
Spanish officers possessed these qualities and conducted their offices with
full dignity and credit, but it can not be said that all officers were so
fully qualified. Such facts in themselves are sufficient to determine the
quality of the person to whom state affairs in Sulu should be trusted.
Further, the reform of a nation can never be fully accomplished
without the aid of her chiefs and leaders. The cooj)eration of the
natives is a very potent factor for good, and a system of government
which aims at the elevation of a conquered nation must find a place in
its machinery for the activities of natives of ability and influence.
Hence the necessity of successful cooperation with natives and the
importance of securing higher qualifications in men holding the highest
offices of government. The fewer such officers are and the abler they
are, the better and safer the result will be. Such men can overcome
racial prejudices and national sentiments and grievances and by the
manner in which they discharge their duties, they can command the
approval and respect of the ruled nation, gain its sympathies to the
side of the government, and maintain peace, prosperity, and good rela-
tions between the governing and the governed nations. However, these
results were not obtained by Spain in Sulu. The religion and racial
prejudices of the two nations were never overcome and the Sulus main-
tained a feeling of re\ailsion and distrust toward Spaniards and Christian
Filipinos.
(Jreat aid is rendered the government wlien the ruling race is com-
petent and resourceful enough to utilize the services of the ruled race and
at the same time give it sufficient space and latitude for the exercise of
its energies and the satisfaction of its ambitions. A most favorable
industrial relation can be maintained, if the capital of the sovereign
nation can find opportunities to invest in the conquered territory, buy up
its crude products, and promote its iiatural resources. The natives then
find work to do, increase in prosperity, and look upon the existence of the
ruling race as favorable for their development and progress, but in case
the subjugated nation is crowded out of its territories and robbed of its
resources by keen competition, greed, or undue domination on the part of
the ruling race, hostilities are bound to arise and disaffection extends
from industrial relations to politics and may lead to trouble and rebellion.
Many Spaniards seemed to regard Sulu as a very desirable country for
colonization and offered many suggestions as to the most favorable sites
for factories, the best industries that could be developed, and the best
methods and means of exploitation. . Several farms were started in the
vicinity of Jolo, but they were abandoned even before the evacuation of
the islands, and no effective step can be said to have been taken by Spain
to colonize Sulu except the building up of the towTi of Jolo itself. This
subject has therefore played no important part in tlie policy exercised by
Spain in Sulu and very little can be said in this connection. It must,
however, be stated that the lands of the Archipelago of Sulu. are extremely
limited in area and should have been reserved for the Sulus. Perfect
disinterestedness should have been exhibited by the Spaniards in this
regard.^
