At all times the condition of the unsubdued regions
of the island of Mindanao and, in general, of the whole archipelago,
has occupied the close attention of the Governors-General of these
Islands, and they have studied, according to their respective views, the
best methods for the complete subjection of the same.
For my part, I have meditated deeply upon every thing relating to
this important matter, and judging both from past experience and from
observations that I have been able to make personally, as I apprised your
Excellency after my return from a visit to the aforementioned island on
May 29th last, I believe it is evident that the adoption of the same
system for the subjection of different races will not be productive of good
results. In the island of Luzon, a properly understood policy of con-
ciliation, accompanied by slight displays of force, will be successful in
conciliating and subduing the people sooner or later; for it may be
observed at once that here there does not exist that great racial an-
tagonism which nearly always makes compromise impossible. Such a
policy, linked with prudence and particularly with justice on the part
of the delegates of authority, will always be productive of great results,
aside from the fact that there are here many villages whose inhabitants
are not warlike, but, on the contrary, are docile, and await only some
slight indication on our part to regard us as protectors and allies against
their enemies.
Much has already been done in this direction, as is shown by the many
politico-military provinces existing in this island; but we should not
stop in this island of progress; and in order to carry forward and con-
summate the complete subjugation of the extensive districts not yet sub-
dued, troops must be detailed, — not in very large numbers, but still in numbers sufficiently large to affect appreciably the service, equally neces-
sary in other regions of the archipelago. This is one of the reasons
which make requisite an increase in the army force stationed here;
further, if the number of the comandancias ^ is to be increased, it is
obvious that, in order to garrison them, more troops are needed.
I have pointed out the need there is for employing different methods
for the subjection of the different races; and in fact, in regard to the
races inhabiting Mindanao, I believe that it is obvious and unquestion-
able that favorable results will never be secured without employing
methods other than those of attraction.
The Moro race is completely antithetic to the Spanish, whether the
latter be peninsular or indigenous, and will ever be our eternal enemy.
The past proves clearly that those ostensible and ephemeral submis-
sions, apparently guaranteed by oaths and agreements, do not bind the
Moros in the slightest degree; for, knowing nothing of the first prin-
ciples of good-faith and loyalty, they do not hesitate to break their
promises whenever a favorable opportunity offers and they think it
possible to defeat our troops. They make a pretense of being trusting
and attentive even to our smallest suggestions, but they are always
watching for a good chance to open up hositilities, and will resort to
treason and cunning.
For these reasons it is well that they should know that we are the
stronger; that our friendship suits their interests because we are backed
by force — which is the only argument they can understand; tliat their
friendship is of no moment to us; and that the instant they antagonize
us, they will be promptly and severely punished.
Having taken up this point of view, the policy that we should adopt
may be inferred.
It is not necessary to imdertake operations on a large scale, or to
open what might be termed a regular compaign, as has been done every
two or three years in the past; but, with our troops established at a
number of fortified places, it may be seen at once from what has been
said above, that we ought to maintain them there at any cost, and that,
abandoning an attitude entirely passive, we should advance little by
little in our conquest, always establishing ourselves firmly on the terri-
tory conquered. In this way we shall, step by step, bring under our
dominion a large area of territor}^, at the same time extending our sphere
of influence towards the interior. Given the conditions above described,
it will be understood at once how much we should lose in importance in
the eyes of such an enemy if, in response to their frequent attacks, we
confined ourselves entirely to a defensive policy, for they would interpret
such an attitude as an indication of weakness; consequently it is impossible for us to maintain an attitude of inactivity : rather, taking advan-
tage of the treacherous conduct of the enemy, we should castigate them
by means of rapid and unexpected excursions lasting a few days, and for
this purpose it is indispensable that small columns of troops be stationed
at two or three well chosen points.
That the Moros are not disposed to be our friends is evident: and
while frequent examples in the history of these islands, in addition to
what has been said above, are sufficient to prove this assertion, it is
further corroborated by the many despatches I have addressed to your
Excellency, apprising you of the attacks made by the Moros upon our
troops and especially of the incidents which have taken place during
the last months of. t lie year 1892. These I will recapitulate succinctly,
as they show that, far from breaking the rebels, the events have only
increased their strength.
On the morning of October 28th, while a reconnaissance was being
made at the post of Baras, the detachment making the same was attacked
by some fifty or sixty Moros, who were awaiting them in ambush. The
latter were, however, repulsed, and our troops being reenforced by a
detachment from the fort, the enemy fled, leaving five dead on the field,
besides two spears, three krises, three kampilan, and two daggers, the
losses on our side being one dead and five wounded.
On the morning of November 9th, again at the time of making a
reconnaissance, at the post of Malabang, our men were attacked by some
sixty Moros, who, being repulsed, fled, leaving six dead on the field —
three others dying later, according to reports received — besides four
kampilan, three krises, one tab as, one lance, and four daggers; the
losses of our side being one soldier killed and six wounded.
These two posts being afterwards visited by the military' commander
of Illana Bay and the politico-military governor of Mindanao, by reason
of reports having been received that some thousand Moros had banded
together for the purpose of attacking these two places, they informed
me that excellent discipline prevailed among the troops of the said
garrisons, and that the Moros must have beaten a retreat, since they
had not been seen in that country.
On my part I have directed that the greatest possible vigilance, care,
and watchfulness be exercised at all the posts, never losing sight of the
fact that they are always in the presence of the enemy, as is proved by
the frequency with which they have been attacked. I have ordered,
further, that, when making reconnaissances or upon any other occasion
when it is necessary to separate a detachment from the main body, the
greatest number of soldiers that the circumstances permit be employed,
so as to prevent a surprise or ambuscade, which aside from tlie direct
loss that it entails, might have the effect of demoralizing tlie troops, and
SO of increasing tlie boldness and temerity of tlie enemy; I have given
special instructions, too, that the officers display in the field the greatest
possible energy, so as to keep up the spirits and confidence of the men.
In the northern portion of Mindanao, between Iligan and Mumungan
the Moros have also been active in making attacks, and although beaten
in every case, thanks to the good discipline prevailing among the men
and the judgment shown by the officers, who inspire the former with
confidence and afford them a good example at all times, they still hope
to have better luck in their future raids, as is proved by the despatches
received from the politico-military commander of Mumungan. These
despatches show that our soldiers no longer fear the Moro race, nor
even the Juramenfados ; and that our men always await the attack of
the enemy with great calmness and braveiy, as is shown by the accounts
of the frequent ambuscades laid and surprises attempted by the Moros.
Already at the beginning of 1892 the attitude of the sultans and datus in
the neighborhood of Mumungan was so questionable that Captain Abad,
then commander of the fort there, having attempted to go up the river
Agus, accompanied by only one officer and four men — thus in the guise
of absolute peace — Datu Ala, of Balud, who is now our friend, stopped
him when he approached his territory, telling him that although he
wished to live at peace with us, he could not allow him to advance further,
nor any part of our troops to do so. In spit<3 of this, two months after
this incident. General Castilla, following closely my instructions, and
taking advantage of the circumstance foreseen by me — that upon his
arrival at Mumungan he was visited by the neighboring datus and sultans,
including the Sultan of Pantar, he announced to the latter, acting under
instructions from me, his intention of returning the friendly visit.
Ijeaving Mumungan early, in spite of a continuous heavy rain storm,
he reached Pantar at about eleven in the morning without making any
stop, accompanied by Ala and another datu, and while he was holding an
affectionate interview with the Sultan of Pantar and the troops were
resting, the captain of engineers, Navarro, made a clandestine inspection
of the ground and took a rough sketch of the best site for the future fort,
close to a bridge that can be built across the river Agus, with a turret or
rough defensive fortification on the opposite bank; this done, General
Castilla returned that same afternoon to Mumungan, which he reached
before night, without having fired a shot, in spit6 of the predictions of
the datus that he might easily meet with resistance on the road.
Later, all the datus living in the region lying between Pantar and
Iligan reiterated to me, personally, in May last, at Mumungan, and later
to the military commander, their protestations of adhesion to Spain.
Afterwards there came the visit that a goodly number of datus, among
them the Datu of Pantar, made me in Manila, where they remained
and were entertained during fifteen days; and with the consistent ap-
proval of these, the road from Iligan to Mumungan was built, in con-
sequence of which work the weekly attendance of Moros at the market of
Iligan increased, and the Datu of Bukamar and another from Marawi
presented themselves in that place. Thither also the Datu Amay-Pakpak,
now an old man, promised to send his son. The concurrence of Moros
at that place was further increased by the assistance that was given to a
wounded Moro; until, at last, a solemn oath of allegiance was secured,
being taken, in the presence of the aforementioned military commander,
by a great number of datus and sultans, in accordance with their ritual.
On November 8th, the military commander of Mumungan, under the
pretext of a wedding to which the Datu of Pantar had invited him and
which he attended, made an inspection of the country in the neighbor-
hood of the said rancheria ^ of Pantar, lying to the south qf Mumungan,
and had an opportunity of seeing that, in conformity with the reports I
had received, Pantar possessed advantageous conditions for the establish-
ment there of another advance fort, the construction of which could be
commenced upon the continuation and completion up to that point of
the new road built from Iligan to Mumungan. But in spite of the
good intentions of the military commander not to break into hostilities
except in the last resort, in accordance with the positive instructions I
had given him, he was unable to prevent his troops being attacked upon
the return journey, and therefore they opened fire upon the enemy;
which proves once again the difficulty of following the path of conciliation
and attraction with an enemy who pays absolutely no heed to reason; in
spite of the fact that with this method there had been joined that of
warning the neighboring Moros who profess to be so friendly, that the
only genuine proof of adhesion to which I should give credit would be that
of the moral and collective support of all of them against any act of
aggression within their territory committed by Moros from other ran-
cheriaSy whether in large or in small numbers.
On November 25th I was informed by the same military commander
that, while the convoy was transferring supplies from Mumungan to
Iligan, there appeared a jiiramentado, who attempted to wound a soldier ;
but the latter, waiting for him with great calmness, defended himself
valiantly, and the Moro was despatched with the assistance of some other
soldiers who came upon the scene.
On the 10th of December I was informed that a detachment of the
troops stationed at Mumungan, while on its way to the market of Iligan
was attacked by a body of fourteen jurainentculos who, however, were
repulsed with a loss of two killed, while, on our side, one man was lost.
