Baltasar Giraudier accompanied General Malcampo to Jolo in 1876
and made special inquiry into the situation in the south. He clearly
stated that the terms of the treaty of 1851 could not be carried out (to
advantage). Failure to observe this treaty provoked the sultan and Sulus
to impatience, resistance,. and a rebellious attitude. Referring to the Jolo
campaign of 1876 he estimated the strength of the attacking army at
approximately 11,000 troops, and described Jolo as an actual church-
yard, held in a constant state of siege, and a great cost to the nation in
men and money. Naked facts, he asserted, did not justify former
expeditions, and hostilities were often provoked for ulterior motives.
Considerable harm resulted from such misdirected measures, while much
good to both nations could have been derived from a policy of attraction,
frank, loyal, and disinterested. Tie called the attention of the author-
ities to the necessity of a faithful observance of the terms of treaties, in
order to expect and demand with right and respect a reciprocal observ-
ance of such treaties by the Moros; to the advisability of honoring and
strengthening the authority of the sultan in order to secure his good
will and cooperation in maintaining peace and harmony and in repress-
ing the evil tendencies of rebellious datus and subchiefs; to the great
advantages that may arise from reestablishing the salary of the sultan
and promoting those friendly relations which tend to strengthen the
Sulu alliance and render this state a stronghold and a protecting wall
against invasion from foreign countries. He condemned the treaty of
1878 as limiting the government's freedom of action and checking the
progress and success of the nation's policy.
He reiterated that there is great need and necessity of defining the
policy of the nation relative to Sulu and the Moro country in general.
Such a grave question should be settled on a firm basis and should not
be subject to the caprice of an individual governor or commander of a
war vessel. No opportunity should be allowed for ignorance, malice,
false pretexts, and ulterior motives that defame the national honor,
weaken the policy of the government, or work to the detriment of the
people and the country. He pointed to several incidents of wrong
conduct or imprudence on the part of officials which provoked trouble
and war and left on the Moros an impression that the Spaniards were
acting deceitfully and in bad faith. The general policy he outlined
for the information of the government and for the uniform conduct of
all officials was submitted in tlie form of recommendations, the most
important of which are ])riefly noted as follows :
1. The siiltan and datus should be treated with respect and consideration.
2. Immediate justice and impartiality should be strictly administered and
practiced in all cases and under all conditions, especially when crime or outrage
is committed against the Moros; for such action would demonstrate in an impres-
sive manner an upright conduct which would command the fullest respect of the
Moros and obedience to law and order.
3. It is of the utmost importance that the belief, temples, and cemeteries
of the people be respected.
4. The speedy punishment of all Moro misconduct and aggression should be
secured through the datu or chief.
5. The fleet should make frequent visits to various islands to familiarize the
people with the flag, to map the country, and to study conditions in general.
6. Religion should be fully tolerated in the same manner as in India and
Java. Proselytism should be prohibited.
7. The sultan should be invited to live in Jolo; an edifice should be constructed
for his residence which would increase his dignity in the eyes of his people; and
he should be given a high office in connection with the government (as secretary)
which would engender and promote his interest in the government and its
welfare and secure needed and desirable cooperation between oflScers and chiefs.
In conclusion, Giraudier pointed to the wisdom of English and Dutch
policy in affording education to the sons of native princes and chiefs
at public expense, to the necessity of large sacrifices at the beginning which
would be amply compensated for by a general pacification of the Archipel-
ago in the end.
