The Sulus watched the progress of Lega«pi at Cebu, Paiiay, and
Luzon, saw how the pagan chiefs were subjugated, and witnessed the
expulsion of tlieir brother Mohammedans from Manila. They had played
this role themselves, and when the enemy reached their shores they
needed no word of explanation or stimulus to resist, except that which they
had in their breeding and general make-up. Spain instigated hostilities
and coveted their domain ; it was not their part to yield, but it was
Spain's clear duty to reestablish peace before the evils resulting from
war outweighed the good obtained. This she failed to do, and the Sulus
were invaded repeatedly and harassed constantly. Bitter animosity filled
the heaits of the Sulus, and a desire for revenge prompted them to
retaliate; and what can be expected from people of their race and civili-
zation except cruelty and barbarity in war! We know that "war is
hell" among highly civilized nations and why should we expect of the
Sulus a moral conduct out of proportion to their intellectual development
and the influences of their civilization and religion? The life of an
"infidel" was not a matter of religious concern to them at all. The
Prophet himself led his people against nonconformists and promised
them reward instead of pardon or intercpsmon before God. The Quran
taught them that patriotism is a part of their religion, and love of
home and family left no place for cowardice and no patience with
humiliation. They therefore fought well and fought cruelly. They
raided the enemy's country, robbed him, and carried away many slaves.
Slavery was also sanctioned by their religion and formed an established
custom or method of punishment which took the place of imprisonment
and saved the expense of jails and guards.
Humanity called for different action on botli sides; but it evidently
made no impression on the Sulus. Not satisfied with just measures of
war and direct retaliation, they developed an abnormal propensity for
piracy, invaded the Spanish domain frequently for the procurement of
slaves and for other wicked purposes, and committed unspeakable horrors
and atrocities. But to treat evil with evil adds no virtue to the credit
of the other side. We rarely read of wounded Moros after an engage-
ment, and, strange to say, all wounds of Moros were invariably immedi-
ately fatal. If few Moros were ever kindly treated after battle, certainly
many more were promptly dispatched in a manner that terminated
suffering and life at the same time.
THE HORRIBLE MISTAKES
Had Spain exerted more effort to increase the Jolo garrison in 1646
and trusted the charge of this garrison to an able and upright adminis-
trator, the fruits of the brillant conquest of General Corcuera would not
have been lost, and in all probability the trouble with Sulu would have
been ended before the termination of the seventeenth century. However,
instead of this course, weak eliaraeters were charged with the iiianagoment
of affairs, and in place of permanent and stroni^ occupation of the land
an insignificant treaty was made with the Sulus with no intention on the
])art of Spain of keeping it permanently and with no liope that it would
he kept by the Sulus. Similar mistakes were frequently repeated and
a cruel inhuman strife marked with an astounding profuseness of blood-
shed and terrible loss of life and evil of all sorts, was prolonged for the
space of three hundred and twenty years without any advantage that is
worth considering.
In consequence of all this, the Sulu has been pictured to the outside
world as a black devil incarnate, borne in mischief and conceived in
iniquity; without a human characteristic, barbarous and savage as his
second cousin the orang-utan of Borneo. The Sulu had no means or
chance of pleading his cause before an international court, and his cry
could not be heard or registered by a foreign hand or press. He was not
met except with a predetermination to fight him. He was not approached
except with the intention of sharing his treasure. He was not invited
except to surrender his right of government and no alternative was offered
him except tribute or death. It is out of reason to expect such people to
abandon their customs, traditions, government, and religion without a
struggle. It is out of reason to expect them to yield to threats and be
daunted by a bombshell shot from a distance. The jungle is thick and
extensive, their boats and sails are ready and light; they know the routes
of the sea and can follow the currents of the ocean in the dark as well
as in the light. The coasts of Borneo and the Celebes are not too far
from them, and living there is as cheap and ea.sy as at home. It is
beyond reason to expect that all sultans, datus, and panglimas will resign
their offices, give up their rank and privileges, and be content to plant
com on the hillside or catch fish along tlie beach. The laws of nature are
not ambiguous, and man is man whether his skin is white or brown.
The chief difficulties Spain had to contend with in the south arose
out of the natural weakness of her system of administration. Her Gov-
ernors-General changed frequently. The Moro question received a sec-
ondary attention, and no definite policy or settled course of action was
ever systematically worked out and followed. What Corcuera planned
was not carried out by his successors, and measures which were approved
by General Terrero were disapproved by General Weyler and ignored
by General Blanco. Had Governor-General Urbiztondo preceded Gov-
ernor-General Claveria, Jolo might have been attacked and conquered
before 1851, and had Governor-General Malcampo preceded Governor-
General Urbiztondo, the garrison of Jolo might have been established
twenty-five years earlier.
The policy of Governor Parrado was not followed by Governor Arolas,
and the plans and pledges of the latter were not fully respected by his
successors. Treaties were made to be broken ratber tban to be obeyed,
and at tbe end of three liundred and twenty years of protracted relations
witb Sulu, no satisfactory policy can be said to have been decided upon
at eitlier Madrid or Manila. The treaty of 1878 was a temporary expe-
dient. It was not intended to express a policy nor did Spain intend to
restrict her influence to tbe provisions of a treaty nor to tie her hands
so fast for any length of time. Spain was intent on the complete con-
quest of Sulu, the assimilation of all the Moro tribes, and the unification
of government, religion, and civilization throughout the Philippine Ar-
chipelago. This ideal was the hope of all governors of Sulu and formed
a concealed motive that prompted their actions and guided their admin-
istration. The governors of Sulu differed only in their ideas as to the
length of time which should pass before the Sulus should be denied their
autonomy, and the methods by which the change could be best brought
around. There were opportune and inopportune times to interfere, which
were left for the Governor-General to decide, and in the majority of cases
his decision was controlled not by the immediate needs of the occasion,
but by interests pertaining to the general administration of the Archipel-
ago, which left partial attention and inadequate means available for the
solution of the vexatious difficulties in the south. Generals who were
anxious to distinguish themselves, took the first opportunity that offered
itself, but satisfied themselves with the immediate results of victory or the
simple correction of the wrong calling for military action, without bearing
in mind the general situation and the requirements of the next step that
should be undertaken as part of a course planned for the carrying out of
a settled general policy. Thus bound to observe the general provisions
of the treaty of 1878, and limited in the authority granted them from
Manila and in the strength of the garrison assigned to Jolo, the governors
of Sulu felt their hands completely tied, and consequently they could
not accomplish much and left matters to drift with the current of
events.
During the governorship of General Terrero, Governor Arolas was
given a free hand and sufficient troops to carry out his plan ; but Arolas
was not much more than a fighting man and an excellent post com-
mander, and the evils of his strenuous measures outweighed the good
he accomplished ; and when the Jolo garrison was subsequently reduced
by Governor-General Weyler his policy could not be continued and was
necessarily doomed to utter failure.
However, nobody was quicker to note such mistakes and to observe the
needs of the situation than the Spanish officers themselves, especially
inspectors-general w^ho were commissioned to investigate matters and
conditions in Sulu, and historians who made a study of Sulu affairs.
