A few closing remarks on the purpose and interests of Spain in Sulu
and the resources she had available for carrying out this purpose may not
be out of place in order to give the reader a clear idea of the final policy
which Spain had for Sulu and to enable him to grasp the scope, complex-
ity, and diflSculties of this problem. However, in discussing these subjects
and the changes they were intended to bring about it must be remembered
that every project on the part of the sovereign nation or Spain calls
for consideration from two points of view — the first is whether the agency
employed was sufficient and adequate to impose the change and carry
it through; the second is the amount of resistance such a project en-
countered on the part of the subject nation or Sulu, and in case the
resistance could be overcome, whether or not a nation like that of the
Sulus was developed sufficiently for the requirements of the change and
for subsequent adaptation to the system it was proposed to inaugurate
Inasmuch as the treaty of 1878 was not abrogated and no distinct
effort was actually made to disregard it, it should be regarded as the
official and most authentic expression of Spain's relation, rights, and
purpose in Sulu. The terms of this treaty gave Spain indisputable
sovereignty over Sulu, the right to occupy all necessary points and to
establish military garrisons wherever needed, the right to establish custom-
houses at occupied points, the*right to limit or control the importation of
firearms, the right to suppress piracy and to demand the Sultan's coopera-
tion in its suppression.
The degree or amount of sovereignty Spain was to exercise over Sulu
was very indefinitely stated. The term "indisputable" does not signify
"complete," as some hasty reports on Moro affairs have expressed it.
The aim of the treaty was to exclude Great Britain, Germany, and other
foreign nations from the Spanish sphere of influence over Sulu, and the
word "indisputable" should be interpreted in this sense, which is clearly
expressed in the Sulu text of the treaty. At that time there was no inten-
tion, on the part of Spain to assume the control of Sulu internal affairs
and the Sulus endeavored to guard their complete freedom and right to
continue their political organization, laws, and religion by specifying those
powers which Spain had a right to exercise over them and by declaring
emphatically that all their customs, usages, and religion should not be
changed. The Sulu word for "customs" signifies laws, organization, and
administrative methods. It is tlie political not the social sense of the
word about which they were so very particular. The treaty did not
entitle Spain to interference, or to institute any measure that tended
toward political change or reform in Sulu. The sultan was left supreme
in the exercise of his authority over Moros. The treaty simply secured
undisputed Spanish control over Sulu's foreign relations and commerce
and incorporated Sulu into the Philippine Archipelago in this sense only.
It further established peace within the Archipelago by checking any
possible revival of Sulu piracy. It appears that both distinguished
governors, Martinez and Parrado, interpreted the treaty in this sense,
and the Sulus certainly so understood it.
Two important steps were taken by Spain later than 1878 in order
to modify the relations established by the treaty. The first of these
steps was a resolution to appoint the Sultan of Sulu or control the
succession to this office. This occurred in 1886 when Sultan Harun
was declared by the Spanish Government, in answer to the requests of
Governor-General Terrero and Governor Arolas, as the legitimate sultan.
By this act the Madrid Government asserted its right to a degree of
actual sovereignty over Sulu internal affairs and backed its assertion with
the necessary force and partially carried it through at the hands of Gov-
ernor Arolas. Jamalul Kiram II finally recognized, to a certain extent,
Spain's authority in this matter and accepted her right of approval or
confirmation of the election.
The second step was an attempt to exact tribute from the Sulus. This
was done by a decree issued in 1894 by Governor-General Blanco directing
that a census be taken of Sulu and a poll tax of 1 "reaV per capita be
collected. Advantage was taken at that time of the strong desire of
Raja Muda Amirul Kiram to become sultan. Sultan Harun was per-
suaded to resign, and the measure adop^d for the collection of the
tribute resulted in the pa}Tnent of a sum of money or its equivalent by
Amirul Kiram and the latter's appointment as sultan. The scheme was
a compromise by which Spain attempted to assume more control over
Sulu, and Amirul Kiram secured his appointment as sultan without
having to go to Manila for this purpose. However, tJie attempt to impose
a tribute on the Sulus appears to have failed completely. No census
was taken and no tribute was asked in later years.
The purpose of Spain, in accordance with her official declarations,
may therefore be summed up as follows: 1. Complete control of Sulu
foreign relations; 2. Complete control of Sulu commerce; 3. The right
to appoint the sultan ; 4. The right to impose tribute on the Sulus.
The first two propositions were legitimate and proper. Both could be
accomplished and retained by virtue of Spain's naval power, merchant
marine, and friendly foreign relations with the European nations. The
Sulus had no navy and no steam vessels. Their native boats could not
offer any significant resistance and were powerless to oppose the Spanish
navy. Ever since 1844 the latter was in the ascendant and by 1870 it had
completely overpowered the Sulu naval forces. Both these propositions
were conceded to Spain in the treaty of 1878 and were justly held ever
since. They strengthened the unity of the Philippine Archipelago and
secured strength and permanent internal peace.
The third proposition, the right to appoint the sultan, was in effect
defeated. It was poor policy. At the end of the bloody struggle that
arose because if it, Spain retained only the right to confirm the choice
of the nation. Had Governor Arolas confined himself to this point
he would have won without a contest and without engendering hostility
and ill feeling toward liis Government. Had a test of arms been the sole
arbiter of the question Governor Arolas might be said to have won his
point completely, for his forces defeated those of the Sulus in every
encounter; but the tenacity of purpose, persistence, and patriotism of
the Sulus outlived his determination, and what was won by force and
cruelty was given up in the end as inadvisable and impolitic. .
The fourth proposition fell through. The best argument that can be
advanced in its favor is that a tribute was actually paid by the Sultan
Jamalul Kiram II in 1894 and that the tax was not imposed in later
years because of the extensive campaign conducted in Mindanao and the
frequent changes of Governor-General, and also because of the Tagalog
insurrection of 1896. Such argument is more in the nature of an apology
than a defense. There is some significance in exacting tribute from the
Sultan of Sulu, but the principal of the tribute was utterly defeated.
The sultan evidently evaded the question entirely as soon as he felt secure
in his office. Such a measure would certainly have been opposed by the
Sulus. They would have risen to a man and sacrificed more life and
treasure in this cause than in the previous one of the appointment of their
candidate for the sultanate. The nation was somewhat divided in the
former case, but in the matter of resisting the payment of a tribute there
was not a dissenting vote. They would have fought most vigorously and
unitedly. Governor Arolas did not exhaust their fighting powers; they
could have fought just as well in 1888 as in 1886-87. One party alone
advanced against Jolo in 1895, and a band attacked landing soldiers in
1897. To pay tribute to a foreign power meant vassalage in their opinion,
and this they could not tolerate. They would fight, not on the strength
of a careful and intelligent estimate of tlieir power as compared to that
of Spain, but because they would not tolerate tlie idea and their national
honor would prompt them to exhaust their strength before they would
yield to such a humiliating proposition. Their fighting power was only
one unit of their national resources ; their national independence, national
character, unity and stability of organization were other units which
added considerable strength to their resistance. What they could not
defeat they would have left alone; what they could not tolerate they
would have evaded ; what they could not evade they would have run away
from.
An exaggerated degree of honor and self-pride, uncontrolled by a certain
degree of intelligence, culture, and moral courage, is dangerous. Courage
unencumbered by prosperity or wealth and spurred by abnormal religious
sentiment, becomes desperate, reckless, and fanatical. Moreover the
treatment by a highly civilized nation of another limited in culture and
development is under moral restrictions similar to those pertaining to the
treatment by a man of mature age of a minor. A minor can not be
blamed for lack of mature reason, and no more can be expected of him
than he is able to do. lie must further be treated with equity and justice,
though he is weak and helpless. It was impossible for the Sulus to
change their character at once. It was absurd to expect of them any
action contrary to their natural disposition and national character. It
was the duty of the sovereign nation to recognize the national character
of her inferior and treat her wisely and justly. Tact might have been
mightier than an army and wise measures might have worked wonders.
Nations can be educated and can develop like individuals and force is a
poor agent where the carrying out of a certain measure is intended to
bring about reform.
Spain imposed tribute upon the Sulus without being prepared to
enforce its collection and before the Sulus were ready for such a measure
and the relation it involved. Granting that the funds derived from the
tax were to be used for the benefit of the Sulus the principle underlying
the institution of the tax is repugnant to the people and no means were
used to remedy tliis feeling or train the people for its tolerance. No
savage or semicivilized natitm can be reformed and governed without
initial expense, nor can reform l>e effected in a day, although forces and
funds are available in plenty.
