POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD (1945-1972)

POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD (1945-1972)

While nationalist movements all over Asia emerged to liberate their lands from
vestiges of European colonial authority, there was a peaceful transfer of sovereign power
in the Philippines. The United States kept its promise to emancipate the country. On
4 July 1946, the Philippines was granted its independence. Thereafter, the country faced
the challenges of a newly independent state and the difficult task of rehabilitation from the ravages of the last world war.

The country faced its first threat to national existence in 1950 when the
Huks/peasants of the Communist Party staged a rebellion in Central Luzon. The Huks
took up arms to protest the abuse and repression they suffered at the hands of landlords
and government troops. The government found a champion in the then Secretary of
National Defense and later President Ramon Magsaysay who envisioned a novel approach
to the Huk problem. It was premised on the principle of "all out force, all-out
friendship." At the political level, Magsaysay restored the people's faith in democracy
by striving to have a clean and honest government. He also concentrated development
resources to the rural areas where the roots of social injustice and discontent were found.

A major aspect of the pacification campaign was the relocation of the members
of the Huk movement who surrendered to resettlement areas in Mindanao. This was
designed to undercut the communist platform of "land to the landless." Besides the
former Huks, hundreds of thousands of Ilongos, Ilocanos and Tagalogs began settling in
Cotabato and Lanao provinces by the 1950's. Culturally and religiously, the policy of
resettling Christians in Mindanao became explosive. It failed to consider the change in
the demography of the island that gradually shifted away from Muslim dominance.

The influx of Christian Filipinos began to inflame Muslim hostility. The crux
of the problem lay in land disputes: Christian migrants to Cotabato for example,
complained that they bought land from one Muslim only to have his relatives refuse to
recognize the sale and demand more money. On the other hand, Muslims claimed that
Christians would title land through government agencies unknown to Muslim residents,
for whom titling was a new institution. Through fraudulent legal claims, the Muslim
residents could be evicted from their homes and land by unscrupulous settlers. The
Bureau of Forestry also awarded vast forest areas as concession to logging firms. These
concessions often included areas under cultivation by Muslim communities. Distrust and
resentment spread to the public school system regarded as an agency for the propagation
of Christian teaching.


The Muslims were gradually outnumbered because of Christian migration.
Economic and social control of the island shifted to the hands of the Christians. The
Muslims, an embattled minority, felt that they have lost control of their homeland and,
like the American Indians and many other ethnic groups, thought that they have been
savagely treated by both colonial and the postindependence national government.

A study made in 1971 quoted 1960 figures to show that, as a direct result of
Christian immigration, there were only two provinces left with Muslim majorities; Lanao
del Sur and Sulu. In Cotabato and Zamboanga del Sur, Muslims had been pushed on to
the defensive. In Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, which used to be their traditional region,
the Muslims accounted for 23.7 % of the population. In national terms they represented
a mere 4.8 % in a population of 39 million.25

1. The Sabah Claim

The formation of Malaysia in 1966 to include Sabah as one of its thirteen states
led to a territorial dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines. The dispute was over
the sultan of Sulu's claim over Sabah. The Sultan of Brunei who originally ruled over
Sabah ceded it to the Sultan of Sulu in 1704 as a reward for helping suppress an uprising
in his domain. In 1878, the Sultan's successor, Jamalul Azam leased the territory to
William Cowie and Baron von Overbeck for 5,000 Malaysian dollars. Overbeck was
then the Austrian consul at HongKong and former local manager of the British opium
firm of Dent and Company. Whether the terms of the deal were, that Sabah was leased
or ceded, would later become a bone of contention between Malaysia and the Philippines.

Soon after the agreement, the British North Borneo Company was formed and awarded
a royal charter. A treaty signed in 1930 by the United States and the British Crown
circumscribed the future territorial jurisdiction of the soon to be established Philippine
Republic. This treaty did not include Sabah within the boundaries of Spanish, American
or Philippine jurisdiction. Then six days after the Philippines was granted independence,
the British North Borneo Company turned over all its rights and obligations to the British 
government, which in turn asserted full sovereign rights over Sabah through the North
Borneo Cessesion Order.26

The first official Philippine act on the Sabah issue was the adoption of House
Resolution No. 42 on April 28, 1950. It stated explicitly that North Borneo belonged
to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu. It also authorized the President to conduct negotiations
for the restoration of sovereign jurisdiction over the territory. The Philippine
government formally notified the United Kingdom of its claim on Sabah on June 1962.
Talks on the issue were scheduled the following December. In the negotiations, the
British rejected the Philippine position in view of the overriding need to form the Federal
Republic of Malaysia, ostensibly to contain communism in Southeast Asia.27

The claim was relegated to the sidelines when it became entangled within the
wider context of the Republic of Indonesia's "confrontation" with Malaysia and the
Sukarno regime's threats to resort to military means to crush the fledgling nation. While
the Philippines refrained from making any open moves against Sabah, it was prepared
to assert its claim in case the Indonesian confrontation became successful.28 Upon
termination of the confrontation, the dispute over Sabah was brought to Bangkok, where
bilateral negotiations aimed at its resolution were abruptly aborted. In the United
Nation's General Assembly, the disputants exchanged contentious charges and
countercharges.29

When the Philippines institutionalized its claim through the enactment of Republic
Act 5546 incorporating Sabah as part of the territory of the Philippines, the Malaysians
suspended diplomatic ties. Diplomatic relations were only restored on 16 December 1969 in time for the third ministerial conference of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations.

2. The Jabidah Incident

In an ill-conceived military plan in 1968, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
organized a Filipino Muslim military group with the codename of "Jabidah," and trained
it on Corregidor Island before infiltrating it into Sabah. When the troops learned of their
destination and mutinied against the project, they were massacred. One soldier who
survived the massacre, sought protection from a politician from the opposition, who later
leaked the incident to the press. This acutely embarrassing incident prompted the
Malaysian government to summon home its ambassador. The incident exposed Marcos
to much criticism and ridicule in what was then still a free press.30

3. The Muslim Independence Movement

On 1 May 1968, former Cotabato Governor Hadji Datu Udtog Matalam
announced the formation of the Muslim Independence Movement at Pagalungan,
Cotabato. The pronouncement marked the beginning of a radical change in Muslim-
Christian relations in Mindanao. The "Manifesto" signed by Matalam called for the
establishment of an Islamic state. The proposed state includes all Muslim areas of the
Southern Philippines and would be known as the "Republic of Mindanao and Sulu."31

Probable causes for Matalam's agitation for the Muslim to secede from the
Republic were the apparent disregard of the government over Muslim lives in the
'Jabidah incident' and his belief that the parochial outlook of the nation did not allow the
development of the Muslims along Islamic orientation, meaning the practice of the laws
ordained by the Holy Koran. Matalam believed that it was not enough that the Muslims
be allowed to practice their religious beliefs but should also be allowed to live in
accordance with the laws laid down by Islam. He saw no possibility for this except through secession. He recognized that the development of the Muslims at par with the
rest of the nation could be accelerated with the Muslims constituting themselves into one
nation, an Islamic state, and drawing their strength from their membership to an
international brotherhood in Islam that transcends the boundaries of national states.32

The "Declaration of Policy" of the Muslim Independence Movement revealed
plainly the yearnings of the Muslims for their identity in Islam. The declaration reads:

That the STATE shall adhere to the Islamic ideological principle
of social justice that those who are better off in life shall share a portion
of his property to be determined by law to the lowly and less fortunate
through the institution of Zakat-legal alms;

That it shall endeavour to create a well-balanced economy, trade
and commerce, following the Islamic ideological principle on the
socialization of the economy in order to bring about a wider distribution
of wealth;

That it shall institute reforms on relations between labor and
management in recognition of the Islamic principle that the employer has
the obligation to share with his employees a proportionate part of his
profits; and

That the STATE shall recognize the generally accepted principles
of international law and the Charter of the United Nations as part of its
laws, in order to achieve world peace and regional cooperation.33

Reflecting the sentiments of the Muslims, the MTM in one of its documents
pointed out the fact that "the destiny of all Muslims in Southeast Asia is to stand together
and fight side by side for the defense of their common religion, cultural identity, social
institutions and national respect and honor against the forces of oppression, subversion,
intolerance and reactionary elements which creep into the Muslim community.34

The manifesto was given a wide distribution in the national and international
press. At first most of Muslim Filipinos showed disinterest in the movement. The
Christians in Cotabato, however, reacted in fear and apprehension. By June 1968 there were reports of Christians fleeing from North Cotabato for fear of Muslim uprising.

Other Christians who had firmly established themselves in productive farms and
businesses opted to stay and prepared to defend themselves against Muslim attempts to
drive them out. Sporadic, small scale raids and retaliation began to happen and toward
the end of 1969, the tension and fear on opposite sides heightened.

Young Turks of the Independence Movement dissatisfied with the political
chicanery and corruption of the old guards began distancing themselves and rallied
behind Nur Misuari in forming the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the late
1960s. Misuari was a faculty member of the Asian Center at the University of the
Philippines in Manila before he organized the MNLF.

4. Shooting War started in South Cotabato

The "shooting war" between Christians and Muslims began on 22 March 1970,
when six people were reported killed and two others wounded at Upi, South Cotabato.
The incident was attributed to a band of tribal Tirurays under the leadership of
"Toothpick" who was reported to be fighting against alleged Muslim terrorism and
exploitation. The conflict spread from Upi to the province of North Cotabato where 18
of the 34 municipalities were in various stages of conflict.35

Following these incidents a terrorist organization of Christians called Ilagas (Rats)
began operating in Cotabato. In response, Muslim armed bands called Blackshirts were
formed to counter the Christian armed groups. The Ilagas started as self-defense units
to protect Christian communities, especially settlers coming from Iloilo province. As the
conflict dragged, the Ilagas degenerated into lawless groups. On the other hand the
Blackshirts formed the military arm of the Muslim Independence Movement.36

On 4 July 1971, the conflict spread to the town of Wao in Lanao del Sur. A
grenade exploded inside a mosque and over 60 Muslim homes were alleged to have been
burned by Ilagas. The Muslim inhabitants of Wao evacuated to the Lake Lanao area and the Maranaos of Lanao del Sur vowed revenge. What followed were incidents of
Christian houses burned and Christians ambushed. Muslim armed groups calling
themselves "Barracudas" began fighting the Christian Ilagas. The Barracudas were
linked with Ali Dimaporo, a Muslim congressman from the Nationalista Party.

Outbreaks of violence appeared to have no definite pattern, rather they occurred
spontaneously where there are large concentrations of Muslim and Christian populations
in the same area. This resulted in the closing of schools in the areas where armed
confrontation occur. Mass evacuations of innocent victims became a common sight. The
sad thing about the situation was Philippine army troops sent in to restore law and order
were accused by the Muslims of siding with the Christians.37

In August, 1971, armed confrontation occurred in the town of Buldon in the
province of North Cotabato. This time the battle was between Muslim Blackshirts and
Philippine Constabulary troopers. Local and foreign leaders began to accuse the
government forces of trying to annihilate the Muslims. To diffuse the explosive
situation, the President sent in a team of negotiators to arrange a cease-fire and forge a
peace pact between opposing parties. The team included a Muslim senator and the
Secretary of National Defense. The resultant peace arrangement led to the surrender of
a few unlicensed weapons and the town receiving P 75,000 for rehabilitation projects.
This settled the problem of Buldon.38

On 26 October, trouble erupted in Lanao del Norte with the ambush of a 22-man
Philippine Constabulary patrol in the town of Magsaysay. Only five government troopers
survived the ambush. The following day, newspapers reported that 66 Muslims were
killed in battle in Magsaysay. The President stopped the military from continuing
"search and destroy" operations in Lanao del Norte and del Sur while he consulted with
political, military, civic and religious leaders of the two Lanao provinces. After the
meeting, he ordered the conduct of military operations against all lawless elements whether they were Ilagas or Barracudas. He also appointed a liaison committee
composed of respected local leaders to work with the military in seeking a lasting peace
in Lanao.

The election day tragedy of November 1971 in Barrio Tacub, Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte shocked the entire nation and won sympathy for the Muslims. Government
troops manning a checkpoint fired upon a group of apparently unarmed Muslims,
returning in several trucks from the special election in Magsaysay town. The incident
which resulted in the death of at least 40 Muslims with no fatality on the government side
was dubbed the "Tacub Massacre." Twenty one army soldiers including three officers
were brought to trial as a result of investigations conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigations. Later, the 21 soldiers plus three civilians, one of them a Christian
mayor, were named respondents in a case of multiple homicide filed with the Provincial
Fiscal of Lanao del Norte.

Muslim Senator Mamintal Tamano earlier warned that a bloodbath in Mindanao
was inevitable unless the national government paid more attention to the needs of the
cultural minorities. He said that for as long as political "warlords" existed and the
neglect of cultural minorities continues, the situation in Lanao and Cotabato will
deteriorate.39 The arrival in mid-January 1972 of eight Muslim ambassadors to see for
themselves the situation in the south manifested the growing international concern over
the conflict in Mindanao. The ambassadors came from Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Singapore, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. They were later convinced, after
visiting various Muslim areas, that there was no genocide against Filipino Muslims.40

Reports of renewed fighting occurred in May 1972. A feud between local
politicians and a logging company in Balabagan in the southeastern corner of Lanao del
Sur broke down into armed conflict. The new fighting occurred in an area of mixed Muslim and Christian population. Zamboanga del Sur and Sulu also came into the
picture as the scenes of new conflict. Reports began to circulate on the existence of
Muslim "training camps" using "Malay speaking" foreign instructors in Sulu. Further,
a "feud" between Iligan City and Marawi City in Lanao del Norte contributed to the
escalation of fears and tensions in both areas. In all these hot spots, evacuations of both
Muslims and Christians continued, resulting in economic dislocation, heightened
resentment between Muslims and Christians, and widened the rift between them.

5. Declaration of Martial Law

In 1972, the country continued to suffer from a severe law and order problem that
saw the proliferation of private armies and unlicensed firearms, frequent staging of rallies
by left wing students, rise in crime rate and a spreading conflict in the southern islands.
President Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed Martial Law on 21 September 1972 to check
these problems. The proclamation practically abrogated the 1935 Constitution and
provided full powers to Marcos. Besides centralizing power, Martial law consolidated
it in the hands of Christians namely: Marcos, his family, his cronies, technocrats and
the military. Martial law also restricted the range of legitimate political activity, giving
the people only two options: either to accept the Marcos regime or conduct revolutionary
activities against the regime. For a short period, Martial Law resulted in an
improvement in the law and order situation in the country, including the hot spots in
Mindanao.41

Apparently the Martial Law policy of collecting loose firearms ran into stiff
resistance from the Muslims who equated arms possession with their distinct culture.
They were concerned that the confiscation of their weapons would leave them
dangerously exposed to their Christian and military enemies. They felt that the political
developments in Manila were threatening their existence and the fear of vulnerability
and resumption of violence left them with few choices. Full scale war broke out one month after the declaration of martial law.42

Violence started in Marawi City in Lanao on October 21, 1972. Fanatical
Muslim rebel forces numbering from 500 to 1,000 made simultaneous attacks on the
Mindanao State University, the provincial headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary
at Camp Amai Pakpak and the Pantar bridge at the boundary of the two Lanao provinces.

This was the first time that the rebels fought under the banner of the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF). The rebels gained control of the PBS radio station in the
University campus and broadcast inflammatory propaganda urging the Muslim Maranaos
to support their cause. The people of Marawi did not heed their call. Failing to get the
people's support, the rebels easily crumbled to the operation of the government troops
to reestablish control over the city. However, before they left, the rebels looted the
homes of Christians and took several as hostage whom they later killed.43 The attack
on a Philippine Constabulary outpost in the town of Parang, Cotabato followed the
Marawi incident. Flare up all over Western Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago
followed.

In November 1972, Muslim rebels landed considerable quantities of arms in Jolo
and the Tawi-Tawi group to the south. In late December, a full scale attack was
launched in those islands. By January 1973, the rebels were in control of about 80% of
the island of Basilan. There were also incidents of violence in some smaller islands of
the Sulu archipelago. When the Armed Forces had almost contained the situation in the
islands, another front opened in the province of Cotabato. For two weeks the security
forces were hit by a series of concerted guerilla attacks. The attack abated only when
enough troops were mustered to rush in and storm the towns and strongholds occupied by the rebels.44 In April 1973, violence erupted in Davao province where there had
been no trouble before. Rebel forces stormed the city of Jolo in February 1974 and held
it for two days before government forces could regain control. The rebels left a large
part of Jolo destroyed by fire, which brought economic misery to the Muslim population.

Although the conflict in the south in the 1960s started from land disputes between
the Muslims and Christian settlers, animosity between the two groups had its origins
during the Spanish colonial period when people from Luzon and Visayas were subjugated
and converted to Christianity and later made to fight the Moros who resisted Spanish
rule. Relations between the two groups did not improve during the American colonial
period. The Muslims were separately administered because of continued Muslim
resistance to American rule. This effectively cut them off from the mainstream of
Philippine society. A land policy encouraging people from Luzon and Visayas to migrate
to Mindanao started the influx of Christians into the Muslim areas. This policy
continued to be implemented even after the attainment of independence in 1946. A major
aspect of the governments solution to the communist rebellion in the 1950s was the
awarding of land to rebel surrenderees in resettlement areas in Mindanao. The Muslims
were alarmed by the unfavorable demographic change. They tried to regain political and
economic control in the traditional Muslim areas, however the Christian settlers who had
already established themselves resisted. After both groups started arming themselves,
armed confrontation became inevitable. What started out as isolated armed confrontations
between Muslims and Christians transformed into a full blown war as the Muslims tried
to secede from the country. How the Moro National Liberation Front became the lead
Muslim secessionist organization is the subject of discussion in the following chapter.






25 George,T. J. S., Op. Cit, p. 15.


26 Samad, Paridah Abd., and Abu Bakar, Darusalam, "Malaysia-Philippine
Relations," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXH, No. 6, June 1992, p. 556.
27 Ibid. , pp. 556-557.
28 Guoxing, Ji, "Current Security Issues in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, Vol.
XXVI, No. 9, September 1986, p. 978.
29 Samad, and Abu Bakar, Op. cit., p. 554.

30 Noble, Lela G., "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," Pacific
Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1976, pp. 408-409.
31 Gowing and McAmis, Op. cit., p. 45.


32 Glang, Alunan, Op. tit., p. 59.
33 Ibid., p. 24.
34 Ibid., p. 25.

35 Gowing and McAmis, Op. cit., p. 46.
36 Ibid., p. 46. 

37 Ibid., p. 47.
38 Ibid., pp. 47-48.

39 Ronquillo, Bernardino, "Broken Promise," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11
December 1971, pp. 14-15.
40 Gowing and McAmis, Op. Cit., p. 50 .
41 Karnow, Stanley, Op. cit., pp. 357-388.

42 George, T. J. S., "For Marcos, the lesser danger," Far Eastern Economic Review,
8 January 1973, p. 24.
43 Gowing and McAmis , Op. Cit., p. 52.

44 Stowe, Judy , " Three-dimensional Muslims," Far Eastern Economic Review, 4
June 1973, p. 25.