1. Military Action
The Government's initial response to the escalating conflict during the first
quarter of 1973 was to put more troops into the troubled area. By the first week of
March 1973, the situation became very serious to require Presidential action. President
Marcos designated Brigadier General Fortunato Abat as head of the newly formed
Central Mindanao Command (CEMCOM). Abat was then the Commanding General of
the Third Infantry Brigade (Separate) in Camp Lapu-lapu, Cebu City. Marcos' orders
to General Abat were:
I am sending a plane right now to bring you to Cotabato. You shall take
command of all units and military personnel (there) ... I have directed
the Chief of Staff to send you reinforcements . . . Study the situation
carefully, plan well. Any thing that you need, don't hesitate to call me
up. ... I want you to report to me directly and as often as you can. .
68
a. Campaign to reestablish control in Cotabato
General Abat assumed operational control of all military and paramilitary
forces in the provinces of Cotabato, South Cotabato and Davao del Sur effective 6 March
1973. The initial phase of the CEMCOM Campaign plan was to consolidate existing
forces and buildup troops and resources. An essential part of this phase was the clearing
of the Parang-Cotabato City road, and sanitizing the Cotabato-Awang complex and using
it as the main base of operations. The second phase was the offensive phase aimed at
the destruction of rebel forces. This called for securing the foothold in Lebak and the
air-head in beleaguered Maganoy as future bases of operations. It also called for the
consolidation of other areas not under rebel control. An essential part of the plan was to strengthen the Civilian Home Defense Forces. This was to enable the people to secure
their respective communities and free AFP units for operations against the main rebel
forces. The third phase was the reestablishment of civil authority. This called for the
appointment of local officials, reintroduction of government agencies, reopening of
schools, and strengthening of police forces. A fourth phase of the campaign plan was
the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase. The fifth and final phase was the
reconciliation phase. An intensive psychological operations directed towards the people
to forget the hatred, animosity and bitterness caused by the conflict will be conducted by
the government.69
CEMCOM first secured the Cotabato City-Awang airport complex from
rebel attack, then it sanitized the surrounding areas in preparation for the launching of
the offensive. The 6th Infantry Brigade was formed out of the reinforcement units that
arrived in Cotabato City and designated the major tactical command of CEMCOM.
The offensive started with the reopening of the 20-kilometer line of communications
between Cotabato City and Parang. Operations started on 10 March 1973 and ended on
21 March 1973 when the road was secured and opened to traffic. The Dinaig operations
followed on 27 March and ended with the capture of the town on the 29th. The next
objective was Datu Piang. It was the seat of control of the rebel held and influenced
areas of the central plain of Cotabato. Datu Piang was where the MNLF Cotabato
Command planned to launch the final assault on the Cotabato City-Awang Complex.
Prior to the offensive, the government airdropped thousands of psychological leaflets
over the town of Datu Piang calling for the residents to convince the rebels to leave the
town within 24 hours and save it from death and destruction. The leaflets also warned
the residents to evacuate the town proper or stay under strong structures and protect
themselves from the bombardment that would take place after the 24-hour deadline.
They were instructed to come out with white flags when they saw the advancing
CEMCOM troops. Other psy-war leaflets urged the rebels to surrender with assurances of safe conduct passage, humanitarian treatment and government assistance. The leaflets
created the desired result. The rebels departed the town before the 24-hour deadline.
The 12th Infantry Battalion occupied Datu Piang on 5 April 1973 without firing a shot.
The Central plain offensive ended with the occupation of Pagalungan on 8 May 1973.70
In its operations, CEMCOM tried to seek the help of traditional leaders
in regaining peace in the area. An example was when military operations were about to
start to regain control of the town of Pagalungan. Datu Udtog Matalam, the moving
spirit of the Mindanao Independence Movement was from this place and General Abat
thought it wise to enlist his help in bringing peace to the area. CEMCOM lifted its
orders on resources and population control on Pagalungan when Datu Matalam agreed
to talk with General Abat. The President also went out of his way to convince Matalam
to help the government by talking to him over the telephone. After the dialogue a
massive civic action program was conducted in Pagalungan. The following government
agencies participated in the civic action: the Philippine National Red Cross, SPARE
(Special Programme of Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Evacuees), Social Welfare,
Health, Agriculture departments and the National Grains Authority. Government effort
to get the support of Matalam paid off. Pagalungan returned to government control with
minimal military effort on 8 May 1973.
b. The MNLF Diversionary Action in Davao
MNLF rebels attacked and occupied the coastal town of Tarragona in
Davao Oriental on 22 April 1973, to relieve pressure on Cotabato. The rebels later
moved toward the town of Mati and threatened the provincial capital. Constabulary
provincial command, police elements and Civilian Home Defense Forces put up a
courageous defense against the rebels. The 6th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army
was tasked to retake Tarragona on 1 May. The town was recaptured on 7 May 1973.
Mopping up operations by the Army followed and ended on 25 August when Davao Oriental Philippine Constabulary reassumed responsibility for law and order.71
c. Military Operations Against Datu Guiwan
Datu Guiwan Mastura held sway over the Muslim population in the three
towns of Lebak, Kalamansig and Palimbang. Guiwan is a direct descendant of Sultan
Kudarat of the Sultanate of Maguindanao. His rebel group was deployed to the east and
south of the town of Lebak. Military operation against Guiwan was launched on 21
March 1973 with the opening of the road between Lebak and Kalamansig. This forced
Guiwan to withdraw to the eastern hills of Lebak and Kalamansig and southward to the
Muslim town of Palimbang. Military units pursued Datu Guiwan and his force to
Palimbang where they caught up with him on 17 April 1973. He was forced to surrender
with nearly a thousand people composed of able-bodied fighters, their wives and
children.
d. The Tran Operations
Tran was the hardest fought piece of real estate in Central Mindanao. This
was the main logistics base of the MNLF's Cotabato Command. The deep waters of
Linao Bay and the wide mouths of its rivers made possible the use of Volvo Penta speed
boats and Kumpits to bring in arms, ammunition and other war material to the rebels.
Tran was heavily fortified with bunkers, trenches, air-raid shelters and land mines. It
was guarded by 600 rebels under Datu Sangki Karon, a former councilman of Lebak.72
Military operations against the rebels started on 6 June 1973. Government
forces included the 21st, the 22nd and the 4th Infantry Battalions PA, the 1st Composite
Infantry Battalion, GHQ, the 554th and 531st Philippine Constabulary Companies and
four ships of the Naval task Group 71.1. The well-entrenched rebels put up heavy
resistance forcing CEMCOM to deploy more troops in the Tran area. As the
government forces kept tightening the noose, pushing the rebels to the octopus head of
the Tran river in Turogan, the density of anti personnel mines increased, causing many casualties. Surrender leaflets addressed to the combatants and non-combatants were
dropped into the area. When military commanders learned of the presence of women and
children in the area, they suspended offensive operations. There were rebel attempts to
break out from the government cordon and most of these were pushed back into the
cordon. A few attempts succeeded by taking advantage of the dark hours and using the
Tran River as escape route to Linao Bay.73
After almost two months of fighting, the rebels could no longer withstand
the pressure of the government onslaught. On 3 August 1973, a thousand rebels and
their families surrendered to the government forces. After gathering them at the mouth
of the Tran River, Navy boats sealifted them to Cotabato City for processing. The Red
Cross, Social Welfare and Health agencies of the government together with civic
organizations were organized to assist the surrenderees.
There were some hold outs among the rebels so mopping up operations
were conducted until the 6th of August. The operation resulted in 46 military and 6
Civilian Home Defence Forces (CHDF) killed in action, and 167 military and 13 CHDF
wounded. On the rebel side, 137 were killed and 981 surrendered.74
e. Other Central Mindanao Operations
Rebel concentration in Reina Regente mountain threatened the Christian
communities of Sultan Kudarat Province and Midsayap and Pikit of North Cotabato.
Military operations to neutralize the rebel concentration were launched on 2 February
1974 with three infantry battalions on the attack. There was a suspension of operations
on the 9th to allow negotiations to take place. Negotiations broke down when the rebels
demanded that the government forces withdraw from the area, that negotiations be
conducted in the presence of UN observers and that negotiations be conducted in a third
country. Military operations resumed immediately after the peace negotiations broke down and after 52 days the rebels were forced out of the area.75
d. The Attack on Jolo
MNLF rebels attacked Jolo on 7 February 1974. Their objective was to
weaken the government forces in their secure base and to create a tangible reminder of
their cause. The attack was especially timed to coincide with the holding of the Islamic
Summit conference in Lahore, Pakistan. The rebels managed to capture the airport but
failed to exploit this initial advantage. Government forces engaged the rebels to regain
areas that came under rebel control. After three days, the rebels withdrew and in thenwake
they set the town on fire. Almost two-thirds of Jolo was razed.76
The rebels failed to hold Jolo long enough to get international recognition
for their Bangsa Moro Republik (Republic of the Moro nation) because they were
overconfident of their strength. But over confidence in its ability to defeat the rebels was
also the reason why military forces decided to step up the pressure against the rebels
toward the end of January. This provoked the rebels to infiltrate and occupy the town.
The result was the destruction of Jolo. In losing the battle to control Jolo, the MNLF lost
prestige and vital access to medicines and information.
g. Balabagan Operation
In Lanao del Sur, a rebel force of 500 men captured the town of Balabagan
on 23 August 1974. The attack cut off two companies of the 26th Infantry Battalion of
the Army. Rebels held the town for two weeks before military operations could be
launched to reestablish government control. Navy ships bombarded the town on 3
September, followed by the landing of a battalion of marines. The 28th and 33rd.
Infantry Battalions from Malabang were also mobilized to link up with the Marines and
take back the town from the rebels. The rebels chose to leave the town instead of facing the combined strength of three battalions. They burned the town as they left.77
h. Cotabato Offensive
The MNLF launched an offensive on Cotabato City in the early hours of
30 January 1975. They started the attack with mortar fire directed at the Philippine
Constabulary Hill in the center of the city. The PC hill, is the headquarters of the joint
Police Constabulary and Army control, and the Central Mindanao Command (Cemcom).
About 14 mortar shells slammed into the PC Hill area, killing a teacher and her mother
and injuring a few others. To neutralize the rebels, the military launched Operation
Thunderball that called for the control of Tamontaka and Taviran rivers and Tumbao and
Kakar-Biniruan areas southeast of Cotabato City. Tumbao was captured on the 18th of
March and the Tamontaka-Tumbao-Taviran river area was cleared and secured by the
30th of March. This removed the threat to the security of the Cotabato City-Awang
complex.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines committed 14 infantry battalions with
accompanying support units against the Bangsa Moro Army in the Parang-Cotabato-
Awang complex, the Central Plains of Cotabato and the Kalamansig-Lebak and Tran
area. The government deployed a total of 50,000 troops or 75-80 percent of the total
AFP's combat strength in Mindanao and Sulu in the 1973-75 period.
2. Diplomatic Offensive
The escalating cost of military operation against the rebels and the possibility of
sanctions by the Middle East countries that controlled its oil supply, forced the Philippine
Government to find other means to resolve the Muslim problem. An orchestrated
diplomatic offensive was launched aimed at closing the flow of foreign support to the
Muslim rebels President Marcos gave priority to establishing friendly relations with
Islamic countries, particularly Egypt which hold a great deal of influence among the
Arabs. The Philippines also supported the Arab cause in the United Nations to persuade Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. These moves were pursued to win
over the sympathy of the Arabs and exert influence to halt the flow of foreign aid to the
Muslim rebels in the south. It was also imperative to win the friendship of these
countries because of the threat of oil embargo, the Philippines being heavily dependent
on the Middle East for its supply of oil.78
The Philippine Delegation to the ASEAN forum made effective use of its position
in the organization to express great concern over the material and moral support given
by some foreign countries to the secessionist movement.
The Philippine government got the support of Indonesia in presenting its case to
the OIC Foreign Ministers Conference in Kuala Lumpur in 1974. Indonesia's influential
position in the OIC was greatly instrumental in swaying the conferees to agree that
secession is not the answer to the 'Muslim problem' in the south. The conferees agreed
that secession is not the solution to the Muslim problem. They urged instead the conduct
of peace negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine government.79
To dispel rumors that the Philippine Government was waging a genocidal
campaign against the Muslims, President Marcos invited representatives of the OIC to
visit and see for themselves the conditions in Mindanao. Saudi Arabian Foreign Minster
Al Shakaff, Libyan Foreign Minister Abdulati al-Obeidi, Somali Foreign Minster Arteh
Ghalib, and Senegal Ambassador to Egypt Moustapha Cisse responded to the invitation.
They came to the Philippines after the conference in Kuala Lumpur. The group visited
Muslim areas in Mindanao and was satisfied of the government programs to uplift the
welfare of the people. The President later conferred on them the Ancient Order of Sultan
Kudarat, a decoration forged in honor of the famous Sultan of Maguindanao.80
The government tried to impress on visiting representatives of the Islamic
countries that the Philippine policy on the Muslim problem in Mindanao is to undertake
full-scale socioeconomic development for the advancement of Muslim and other cultural
minorities. Also it tried to show that it is reducing the use of its armed forces to resolve
the problem. As part of the administration's policy of pacification and to broaden the
base of Muslim participation, the government granted amnesty to rebels who joined the
government's peace and order campaign. More and more Muslims got appointed to
national and local administrative positions.81
On 29 May 1974, President Marcos, accompanied among others by Executive
Secretary Alejandro Melchor, Chairman of the Presidential Task Force for the
Rehabilitation of Mindanao, met with President Suharto of Indonesia at Menado, North
Sulawesi. They discussed matters crucial to the solidarity of the region and problems
affecting ASEAN. What Marcos asked from Suharto and the leaders of Islamic states
with whom he has taken care to maintain friendly relations was that they refrain from
intervening in the conflict in Mindanao and allow him to bring about a peaceful solution
to the problem. Without outside support, the rebels are not expected to fight a successful
guerilla war. Then, with a massive development effort to channel more of the nation's
resources to Mindanao, the Administration hoped to improve economic and social
conditions to a point where it can achieve a peaceful and less costly solution to the
Muslim problem.82
Diplomatic moves by the Government apparently had some success, since there
was a marked decrease in the flow of arms to the rebels. This coincided with the defeat
of Tun Mustapha in the Sabah elections in the middle of 1975. Mustapha's successor,
Datuk Harris Salleh, assured the Philippines that he will not support or assist the Filipino
rebels.
3. Socioeconomic development
The government also gave emphasis to the policy of wooing the Muslim
population, extending to them as much economic aid as possible, promoting their cultural
heritage and attending to their educational and social needs. The Government built more
roads, irrigation systems and schoolhouses especially in Muslim dominated provinces.
The Amanah Bank, which served the southern provinces, revised its operations
to conform with the Islamic concept of banking (no interest and partnership principles).
It was also tasked to handle the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca so that Muslims could travel
in relative comfort. Restrictions on the historic barter trade with Borneo was also
removed.83
Major portions of loans secured from the World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank and other United Nations organizations were invested in infrastructure and
socioeconomic projects in Mindanao. By pursuing a faster and more meaningful
development programme, the Administration hoped to win the support of the Muslims
and deprive the rebels of mass base support.84
To foster the Muslim culture, an Institute of Islamic Studies was established at
the University of the Philippines in Quezon City. The government also proclaimed
Muslim holidays for the region. There was also a commitment of the government to
codify Muslim laws.
The Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) was created to foster
and accelerate the balanced growth of the region. In 1979-80, the SPDA charter was
revised to concentrate on the development of economically viable ventures. Social
development functions and non-corporate projects were transferred to the appropriate
agencies of government.85 A rehabilitation program for MNLF and other allied groups/individuals working/ cooperating with the government development effort in Southern Philippines was also established by the president in 1980 with a special fund of P 25 million administered through the SPDA.
4. Moves to Discredit the MNLF
Capitalizing on the ideological and ethnic/regional differences within the Muslim
population and the insecurity of the Christians in the south, the Marcos government
undertook a program to discredit the MNLF. It tried to show that the MNLF does not
represent the sentiments of the Filipino Muslims.
In June 1974, a conference in Marawi City sponsored by the 'Federation of the
Royal Houses of Mindanao and Sulu' placed on record its unanimous vote of confidence
in President Marcos' leadership. It presented a list of proposals that were broadly
sympathetic with the government's attempts to deal with the problem through
socioeconomic reform. The government in fact financed the conference.86
On 17 April 1975, the government initiated a peace conference with rebel leaders
in Zamboanga City. This was timed to coincide with the negotiations between the
government and the MNLF in Jeddah. Forty-two "rebel leaders" responded to the
invitation and attended with 160 of their followers. The MNLF boycotted the meeting,
however the government claimed that 26 of the men who attended were MNLF leaders.
An MNLF spokesman admitted that five MNLF cadres did attend but all have already
gone over to the government. The government got what it wanted from the delegates, a
statement denouncing Nur Misuari and the MNLF's demand for autonomy. In return
the Government accepted a list of six demands. These included a call for more
development funds for the Muslim areas and punishment of corrupt civil and military
officials.87
The Marcos government made strenuous efforts to solicit the support of
conservative Muslim leaders to convince MNLF members to surrender. Inducements
came in the form of amnesty and incentives ranging from cash grants, logging
concessions and scholarships to military commissions and placements in the government
at the municipal or regional assembly level.
To further discredit the MNLF in the eyes of the Muslim populace and the
international community, the government labeled the organization as 'Maoist' and Nur
Misuari as a Communist. The government also blamed the MNLF for every act of
violence and lawlessness that occurred in the Southern provinces.88
5. Policy toward the Muslim's clamor for greater autonomy
Although the Philippine Government was negotiating with Muslim rebel leaders,
the official stand was not to allow the rebels to form a separate entity within a federation.
This was made clear by Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in a rare press
briefing in November 1974. The Government "will not change the political structure of
the country," he said. During the briefing attended by senior military officers, Enrile
announced that contacts have been made with the leaders of the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF). He also announced that the Government was negotiating separately with
other rebel groups that were not part of the MNLF. According to Enrile and the
Military, the number of Muslim rebels fighting the Government dropped from the 1973
peak of 16,000 to about 6,000 in 1974. Enrile however admitted that the mass base
supporting the armed rebels was still around 400,000.89
6. Initial Peace Negotiations
On January 1975, Presidential Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor led the
government panel that went to Jeddah to discuss initial peace plans with the rebels. The meeting was held under the auspices of the Islamic Conference. The government panel
noted that they could get down to some constructive haggling with MNLF leaders on an
informal basis outside the conference room, in truly Filipino manner. Over the
conference table, the MNLF leaders were unyielding in their demands for full autonomy
and a separate security force in the south. It was obvious to the Philippine government
panel that the Libyans were dictating to the Muslim rebel leaders. MNLF negotiators
refused to do anything but read from a prepared text.90
During the negotiations, Government negotiators refused to touch on the issue
of autonomy unless ceasefire procedures were first discussed. MNLF representatives
were also rigid in wanting to discuss the autonomy issue first. There was no meeting of
the minds so the negotiations between the Government and the Muslims bogged down.
The Philippine government accused the MNLF of being manipulated by 'outside forces'.
Subsequently, Melchor returned to Manila empty handed. The Philippine government
said it would never again negotiate with the MNLF outside the country.
7. The Tripoli Agreement
The OIC applied continuous pressure to the Philippine Government and the
MNLF to resume peace negotiations. The Islamic Conference meetings in Jeddah in July
1975 and Istanbul in May 1976, reiterated the appeal first made by the Conference in
Kuala Lumpur in 1974, for Manila and the Muslim rebels to resume the talk.
Philippines' ASEAN partners, Malaysia and Indonesia, also worked behind the scenes
to arrange for the two sides to resume negotiations. The visit of Libyan Vice-Foreign
Minister Ali Trekki and other Conference representatives to the Philippines in August
1976 started the ball rolling for the second round of peace negotiations. Trekki told
Philippine Government officials that Libyan officials prevailed on the MNLF leadership
to relax their stand in order to resume talks. He and the other OIC representatives
brought the message that the MNLF was ready to resume negotiations. President Marcos responded immediately by selecting a panel to represent the Government in talks.91
The financial support given by Libya and the residency of the MNLF leadership
in Libya positioned Muammar Qaddafi to strongly influence the MNLF. The influence
became stronger after the 1976 Islamic Conference in Istanbul when the OIC told Misuari
that he would have to rely solely on the Libyans for bis supplies, as no other Islamic
country was prepared to help in the same way.
During the August visit of the OIC representatives, invitations were exchanged
for President and Mrs. Marcos to visit Tripoli and for Libyan leader Qaddafi to come
to Manila. President Marcos took advantage of the invitation to send Mrs. Marcos to
Tripoli in mid-November.
The First Lady's visit scheduled to last only two days was extended for another
two days to enable her to meet with Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. The
meeting resulted in an agreement over the date for the second round of peace
negotiations. A mutually acceptable joint communique was also issued by both parties.
The negotiation between the Philippine Government panel and MNLF leaders was to start
on 15 December in Tripoli. The communique's delicate wording of the passage relating
to the Muslim rebellion said that the Libyans expressed satisfaction at the positions of the
Philippine Government and that of the liberation fronts of Muslims, be it Moro or
elsewhere, in accepting all the resolutions of the Islamic conference aiming at finding a
justful {sic} solution acceptable to both parties concerned. This was a bit of double talk
because the Libyans agreed to Manila's claim that the MNLF is only one Muslim rebel
faction in the south, while "accepting all the resolutions of the Islamic conference" meant
recognizing the MNLF as the sole spokesman. The Islamic conference resolution called
for a continuation of talks. While the MNLF wants "belligerent status," the Philippine
Government can only accord it "non-belligerent status."92
National Defense Under-Secretary for Civil Relations Carmelo Barbero led the
government panel that met with Nur Misuari in the series of talks in Tripoli, Libya
starting 15 December 1976. The other members of the government panel were
Philippine Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Liningding Pangandaman, Ambassador to Algeria
Pacifico Castro and Muslim commissioner for Region XII Simeon Datumanong. Libyan
Vice Foreign Minister Ali Trekki carried out most of the negotiations on behalf of the
MNLF.93
Before the talks, the government launched a carefully orchestrated campaign to
discredit the MNLF in the government guided media. Marcos' favorite tactic of 'divide
and rule' was evident in the dailies where feature stories were of pro-Government
Muslim officials and "youth leaders" in the south rejecting the MNLF's demands and
saying that the rebel group was not supported by the people and should be dissolved.
The nine points demand of the MNLF presented during the talks were: Muslim
control of (1) government and (2) security forces in the south; control of (3)
administration, (4) judiciary and (5) education up to secondary-school level; (6) economic
autonomy; the right to participate in the (7) central Government and (8) all organs of the
State; and (9) the "establishment of Islamic life and society".94
As the first step toward possible peace settlement, Philippine Government
representatives and leaders of the MNLF agreed to a cease-fire on 24 December 1976.
Both panels agreed that cessation of hostilities start on December 24 and be consolidated
by 20 January 1977. A committee of 52, comprising equal numbers of Government and
MNLF representatives with Islamic Conference members, would supervise the
implementation of the cease-fire. Further talks were scheduled in Tripoli from February
5 to March 3, to hammer out a more substantive agreement. And finally, all being well, a peace agreement was scheduled to be signed in Manila on 7 April, to which Qaddafi
was invited.95
The initial agreement promised autonomy to 13 provinces in the south: Tawi-
Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Palawan, Lanao del
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, South Cotabato
and Davao del Sur. The MNLF originally demanded autonomy for the whole of
Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan area that comprised 21 provinces. The
Autonomous region would have its own security forces, but under the control of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Muslim courts would be organized to enforce Islamic
codes relating to administration and personal family relations, but these would have to
operate under proposed new centrally adopted codes.
Much of the credit for bringing the two parties to the conference table and
inducing them to relax their formerly rigid stands sufficiently to reach an agreement of
sorts goes to a committee of four within the Islamic Conference(representing Libya,
Senegal, Saudi Arabia and Somalia) and particularly Libya's much maligned leader
Muammar Qaddafi.96
8. Government action to Implement the Tripoli Agreement
The Government said that the Tripoli Agreement was implementable under the
regional autonomy system which is allowed under Article II of the Constitution. Said
Article says that "local governments may group themselves or consolidate or coordinate
their efforts, services and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them." This
is precisely the same Article that the MNLF wanted to invoke in the past, which they had
been told was unacceptable. Working on a loophole that could reduce the size of the
area granted autonomy, President Marcos said that a plebiscite in the affected areas is
required by the Constitution, a move that was not discussed in Libya. People would be asked in the plebiscite whether they wanted to become part of the autonomous region.97
This was apparently a balancing act by the government. It wanted to appear that it is for
Muslim autonomy and at the same time would not want to antagonize the Christian
majority in the proposed autonomous region.
President Marcos signed a decree on 14 February 1977 ordering the holding of
a plebiscite in the thirteen provinces that comprised the proposed autonomous region.98
The plebiscite scheduled on the 21st of February was later reset to 17 March. This was
to give people ample time to learn the exact nature of the autonomous region.
Meanwhile, negotiations were in progress in Tripoli.
The MNLF panel was upset with President Marcos' announcement and threatened
to resume fighting in the south. Their Libyan host however persuaded them to simply
agree to a postponement of the plebiscite. The rebels had every reason to be alarmed
because only five provinces have Muslim majorities in the proposed autonomous region
of thirteen (13) provinces. They feared the vote would be overwhelmingly against their
plans for a cohesive Muslim region.
Establishment of the security forces for the Autonomous region was another area
of dispute. The Tripoli agreement says that "special regional security forces are to be
set up in the area of the autonomy for the Muslims in the south of the Philippines. The
relationship between these forces and the central security forces shall be fixed later."
Marcos interpreted this provision of the agreement to mean that Muslims could join the
armed forces. In one of his speaking engagements, Marcos said,
That merely means, if you want to join the armed forces, sure, qualify,
train, by all means because whether you are Muslims or non-Muslims you
have the right to be a part of the armed forces. . . But to take them out
bodily without any further qualifications and recognize them as the only armed forces in the area, no 99
The MNLF interpreted the provision differently. MNLF spokesman Farouk
Hussin said, "I think in the agreement, it mentions that we will have our own security
forces. There was no question of being under the direct supervision of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines."100
The second round of talks between the Philippine government and the MNLF,
which was to complete the peace settlement agreed upon previously, broke down
completely by April. The MNLF rejected the Philippine Government's proposal for a
referendum while the Philippine government accused the MNLF of abandoning its earlier
acceptance of regional autonomy and reverting to a secessionist position. Both sides also
accused each other of cease-fire violations. With the breakdown of the talks, Defense
Undersecretary Carmelo Barbero returned to Manila for consultations. In a meeting of
the National Security Council, Barbero said that what is needed to break the impasse in
the peace negotiations is personal diplomacy at the highest level.
Again President Marcos sent the First Lady, Imelda Marcos to Tripoli to woo
Qaddafi. The result was an exchange of cables between Qaddafi and President Marcos
in which they agreed on a settlement. They agreed that President Marcos will quickly
proclaim autonomy in the 13 provinces, set up a provisional government of "concerned
parties," and then hold a referendum to settle the administrative details.
The most important aspect of the agreement was the issue on the holding of a
referendum. Whatever Qaddafi had in mind, Marcos clearly knew he could use this
concession to his advantage. He lost no time announcing that in the referendum, people
would still be asked if they wanted to be part of a single autonomous region, even though
he had earlier assured the MNLF that they would help to draw up the referendum questions. When asked what was the point of proclaiming autonomy in the 13 provinces
before the referendum if people could then vote against it, Marcos answer was that every
province would eventually have a degree of autonomy under his plan to set up
autonomous regions all over the country.
The plebiscite was held on 17 April 1977. In 10 of the 13 provinces voters were
asked whether they approved the merger of their existing two regions into a single
autonomous region. In the three other provinces, voters were asked whether they wanted
to join such a region. Voters were also asked if they wanted the MNLF form of
autonomy, based on the MNLF proposal which called for the setting up of a virtually
separate state under rebel control or if they wanted the Government's much more diluted
autonomous arrangement under central control. The result was a more than 90% rejection
of the MNLF plan. The voters also voted against the formation of a Bangsa Moro
Islamic state, with its own flag, language, court system and security force under the
control of the rebel group. Official record showed that most people wanted Manila to
retain control under its form of limited autonomy for the various parts of the region. 101
Although 21 embassies accepted the government's invitation to observe the voting,
the Islamic Conference did not send any delegates. This was to show its displeasure over
the perceived insincerity of the Philippine government in reaching a peaceful solution to
the Muslim problem. The OIC's interpretation of the referendum portion of the Qaddafi-
Marcos agreement was for the plebisicite to decide only the administrative arrangements
for the autonomous region and not to decide which provinces would be included in said
region. Predictably, the MNLF boycotted the plebiscite. Misuari himself described the
plebiscite as "illegal." He also rejected the provisional government setup by Marcos as
agreed in the exchange of cables with Qaddafi. Regional Commissioner Simeon
Datumanong and 13 governors comprised the membership of the provisional government.
Six of the members were Muslims. Later Marcos increased the membership to 15 and invited the MNLF to supply most of the members including Misuari as chairman.
Misuari again rejected the offer so the provisional government remained a government
staffed body under the Department of Local Government and Community Development.
The Islamic Conference reacted to the Philippine Government actions by issuing
the 11-point resolution on the Philippines during the meeting in Tripoli. The conference
deplored Manila's "negative attitude" in "shrinking its international responsibilities and
obligations" under the Tripoli agreement. Manila was also held responsible for the
breakdown in negotiations after the Tripoli agreement. It ominously called on Islamic
countries to support the MNLF "in all ways to achieve all the demands of the Muslims"
in the area. It recognized the MNLF as the legitimate representative of Muslims in the
Philippines. It also entrusted the Islamic Conference Secretary-General with the task of
consulting Islamic states to provide "emergency assistance" to them.102
Despite the April 1977 breakdown in peace negotiations, the cease-fire remained
in effect officially. Rebels who clashed with government forces were always referred
to by government spokesmen as "bandits" to make it appear that the cease-fire was still
in force. Continued implementation of the cease-fire however dimmed when a landmine
allegedly planted by the MNLF blew up a lorry carrying plantation workers in the island
of Basilan. The military launched a retaliatory operation against the MNLF camp in the
mountainous Mahayahay region of southern Basilan. Air strikes and artillery backed the
government troops. Pitched battles also occurred simultaneously in Jolo. Although there
was an escalation in armed confrontation between the government forces and the MNLF,
the cease-fire was still holding on the whole.
9. Resumption of Hostilities
The fragile ceasefire finally broke down when Brigadier General Teodolfo
Bautista, five colonels and 27 other officers and men were massacred on 10 October
1977 in the municipality of Paticul in Jolo. The General and his men were cut down by the rebels as they entered the marketplace in Danag to negotiate the surrender of the
rebels. The one responsible for the "act of treachery" was Commander Usman Sali.
Revulsion over the killing, both in the Philippines and in other countries, gained
propaganda points for the government. Offensive action by government troops aimed at
grabbing rebel leader Usman Sali left a large area of Jolo a 'no-man's land'.103
Fighting between government troops and Muslim rebels resumed in full swing on
several fronts. Negotiated settlement of the conflict became hopeless with the breakdown
of the cease-fire. The refugee problem arising from the conflict reached alarming
proportions. By this time there were 100,000 people in evacuation centers in the region.
With the renewed hostilities, the MNLF's objective shifted from autonomy to complete
independence. Misuari instructed his field commanders to drop the autonomy cause and
instead concentrate on secession.104
In a turn around, the Marcos government stopped referring to the rebels in the
south as MNLF. The government reasoned out that the MNLF disintegrated into bands
of terrorists who carried out more than 600 violations of the cease-fire agreement and
against whom "police actions" were conducted by the AFP. In the first 'white paper'
issued since the declaration of Martial Law, the Government justified the action against
the rebels as "punitive action against terrorists, outlaws and violators of the cease-fire,
and as defensive action to protect military outposts and to safeguard civilian population
centers." In an interview with then Far Eastern Economic Review Manila bureau chief
Rodney Tasker, Marcos justified his not referring to the MNLF by saying,
Yes, because they have, as I have repeatedly said, been reduced now
again into the same diverse outlaw bands with their own individual
objectives. Many of these men, who are engaged in depredations, pillage
and looting, refuse to receive orders from those whom they call their senior commanders. That is why we call them outlaws.105
10. Organizing the Regional Assemblies
The holding of the elections to the first Regional Assemblies for Regions 9 and
12 on 7 May 1979, was in furtherance of Marcos commitment to grant meaningful
autonomy to Muslim areas in Southern Philippines. Political observers however viewed
this move of the government to speed up "normalization" of the political situation and
attain peace in the battle-torn Muslim regions as short on credibility.106
Despite Marcos personal invitation to Nur Misuari, the MNLF chairman and
Hashim Salamat who heads the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), to participate in
the political exercise, the two chose to snub the offer. As planned, the regional
assemblies were to be organized through elections in the two southern regions where
Muslims are concentrated. Region nine comprises the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte (including the cities of Dipolog and Dapitan) and
Zamboanga del Sur (including the cities of Pagadian and Zamboanga). Region 12 covers
the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and
Sultan Kudarat and the cities of Iligan, Marawi and Cotabato. Seventeen elected
representatives, four sectoral representatives and an unspecified number of Marcos
appointees composed the assembly membership. The regional assemblies as envisaged
exercised very limited powers. While they could impose taxes and legislate on regional
affairs within the scope of national programs, they had no jurisdiction over defense,
security, foreign trade, monetary affairs, communication systems, natural resource
utilization, and immigration. Such limited authority was not acceptable to the MNLF.
To make the elections successful and within the purview of the Tripoli accord,
there had to be significant participation of the MNLF. However, candidates with the true
backing of the MNLF were conspicuously absent. This greatly dimmed any hope to get an endorsement of the polls by the Islamic conference in its meeting in Morocco.
Apart from timing the elections to coincide with the opening of UNCTAD V,
Marcos knew that the day after the election, foreign ministers of the 42-member Islamic
Conference were due to meet in Morocco. He may have anticipated that by appearing
to hand over a form of self-government to Muslim areas as demanded by the MNLF, he
would preempt any move by the Organization of Islamic Conference to take punitive
action against Manila.
The traditional political opposition also chose to ignore the elections for it was
embittered over the result of the previous elections to the Interim National Assembly
which it claimed to have been massively rigged. What came up were token opposition
parties against the well-organized ruling party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New
Society Movement). As predicted, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan candidates swept the
polls.107
11. Rift in the secessionist movement
Attempts to discredit the MNLF and sow discord among Moro leadership began
to show some signs of success by the later part of the 1970s. A combination of
spontaneous splitting within the movement and alternate enlightening and devious policies
by the government caused a rift in the organization.
a. Moro Reform Liberation Movement (MRLM)
Signs of disunity first became evident in January 1977 when a new group,
calling itself the Moro Reform Liberation Movement (MRLM) popped up. It sent
representatives to see Marcos in Manila and demanded for separate negotiations with the
government. Former MNLF rebels comprised the bulk of the MRLM's membership.
They claimed to have 26,000 fighters, the same number that the Government claimed to
have surrendered over the past four years. Whatever the truth of the group's dubious
claim to being a major faction in the south, the fact that Marcos agreed to consider their resolutions upset the OIC, which insisted that Manila deal only with the MNLF.108
Many prominent MRLM members had reason to be afraid of reprisals
under any pro-MNLF autonomous government. For instance one of the MRLM leaders
was Judge Abdul Hamid Lukman, a former spokesman for the MNLF who surrendered
to the government and later became the deputy commissioner of Region IX (Nine),
covering the Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga area. Two others, Maas Bawang Estino
and Al Caluang, were well known former MNLF field commanders from Jolo. Another
was Amilpasa Bandaying, a former MNLF fighter who became the aide to Southern
Command chief Rear Admiral Romulo Espaldon.109
There was lots of speculation why President Marcos decided to bring in
another Muslim faction into play at said time. It could be that the government
anticipated that the move would antagonize the Islamic Conference and would therefore
preempt any finalization of the peace agreement. Taken from another angle, by agreeing
to talk to all factions, he would be seen to be trying to bring genuine peace to the area.
MRLM's surprise bid for recognition as another faction of the Muslim
populace that the government needed to deal with, showed that everything was not well
within the Secessionist Movement. Throughout the struggle in the south, Misuari and
his central committee had been based in the Libyan capital of Tripoli. There was known
to be some disenchantment about this situation among certain MNLF field commanders,
who, while bearing the brunt of the fighting, felt remote from their leaders. Factionalism
began to beset the MNLF organization. Many tough field commanders dissatisfied with
the MNLF leadership surrendered to the government.
b. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front
A split in the MNLF occurred in the late 1970s because of differing goals,
revival of traditional tribal rivalries, and competition among Muslim leaders for control
of the movement. The first break occurred after the April referendum in 1977 when
Hashim Salamat accused Misuari of autocratic leadership, communist sympathies and
corruption. Supported by ethnic Maguindanaos from Mindanao, Salamat formed the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MTLF), which advocated more moderate and conciliatory
approach toward the government. Salamat, a former Islamic scholar at Cairo
University, chose to establish himself in Cairo after his split with Misuari. His leadership
appealed to the more fundamentalist Muslims particularly from his own Maguindanaon
tribe.110
The MILF ideology emphasized the role of Islam in the struggle for
autonomy and self-determination. It teaches its followers to embrace Islam as their way
of life and to make supreme the work of Allah. It considers all Muslims as brothers
living in a worldwide community called Islamic Ummah. united and equal despite race,
color or station in life. Its emphasis is the establishment of a strong Bangsa Moro
Autonomous government in a Bangsamoro homeland where everyone will enjoy equal
treatment irrespective of creed and religion under a true Islamic system.
According to the MTLF leadership, the breakaway faction seeks autonomy
and not secession. It stressed that the MILF abandoned the secessionist stance in
response to thousands of appeals and resolutions submitted to the OIC calling for just
solution to the Mindanao conflict. It defined its goals as "the establishment of a
democratic system of government with equal representation in the executive, legislative
and judicial departments following the principle of elections . . . centering on selfdetermination,
except in foreign affairs and national defense."
It also proposed the creation of a regional security force subject to
discussions in a negotiation with the central government. MILF accepted and recognized
that Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan are parts of the Philippine Republic. To
the MILF leadership, the Tripoli Agreement is a major component in the negotiations for
autonomy, since it involved the participation of the OIC. Regarding its position on the
territory of the autonomous government, MILF's position was close to the governments
idea of two autonomous governments.111
While it is in favor of autonomy, the MILF said it will continue
stockpiling arms while waiting the result of peace negotiations with the government.
MILF spokesman and Vice Chairman for Political Affairs, Ghadzali Gaafar said the arms
buildup will continue "unless we achieve our demands for a genuine autonomy for the
Bangsa Moro people, including our Christian brothers."112
c. Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO)
Misuari's larger and more militant MNLF was further weakened during
that period when rival leaders formed the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization. The
BMLO drew many Mindanao Maranaos away from the MNLF dominated by Misuari's
Sulu based Tausug tribe. The Saudi Arabia-based leadership of the BMLO was mainly
pre-martial law Muslim politicians and community leaders who lived in voluntary exile.
BMLO leader, former congressman Rashid Lucman said that the BMLO differed from
the Nur Misuari MNLF leadership over tactics and goals in the Muslim struggle. The
BMLO's ultimate aim is to form a united front to represent Filipino Muslims.113
In 1978, MNLF Vice-chairman Abul Khayr Alonto surrendered to the
government after a difference of opinion with Misuari. His decision to quit the MNLF
might have been aggravated by Misuari's alleged communist sympathies. He later
accepted the offer of President Marcos to become the speaker of Region XH assembly.
d. MNLF-Reformist Group
A further split in the MNLF occurred in 1982 when then Vice Chairman
Dimasangkay Pundato, a Maranao, formed the MNLF 'Reformist Group' (MNLF-RG)
in Jeddah. Pundato later reached an alliance with the BMLO and the Salamat faction in
a 'Coordinating Council of the MNLF-BMLO'. Pundato's breakaway was the result of
a dispute with Misuari over the latter's reversion to a secessionist position.114
The Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization eventually collapsed, giving
way to the Moro National Liberation Front-Reformist Group. The breakaway group
declared itself opposed to the extremist left revolutionary ideology of the MNLF. Some
observers believe that the new group only sought decentralization of power that had
become a monopoly of the main line MNLF. Pundato is more of a moderate leader who
seeks only real autonomy in the predominantly Muslim areas. He was believed to be
based in Sabah when he broke away from Misuari's faction. Though estimates of his
field strength vary, his faction was viewed by the military as one with more growth
potential than the other two factions.115
Moro factionalism, compounded by declining foreign support and general war
weariness, hurt the Muslim secessionist movement both on the battlefield and at the
negotiating table. MNLF's Libyan based chairman Nur Misuari, and his former deputy,
Hashim Salamat, had accused each other of absconding with foreign funds intended for
the movement. The split in the MNLF coincided with the cooling off of the relationship
between Misuari and Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi. Misuari later set up MNLF Offices in Damascus, Jeddah and Tehran. He appeared to have shifted his base to these
places and received support from King Khalid of Saudi Arabia and from the Khomeni
regime in Iran.
President Marcos capitalized on the split in the leadership of the MNLF as a
reason to be reluctant to seek further peace talks with the rebels. Moro fighting strength
declined to about 15,000 by 1983, as more rebels surrendered to the government. During
Marcos' last year in office armed confrontation was sporadic.116
Following the assassination of former senator and opposition leader Benigno
Aquino on 21 August 1983, the MNLF struggle suffered a loss of momentum. Aquino's
assassination gave Misuari a reason to reject any further negotiations with the Marcos
regime. In an interview, Misuari said "We don't want to be identified with a murderous
regime." He also said that he had been in touch with various factions of the political
opposition in Manila since Aquino's death. He claimed that these groups were prepared
to accommodate Muslim demands for independence in a post Marcos scenario.117
Despite the breakaway of the MILF and MNLF-Reformist Group from the main
line MNLF organization, it appeared that Nur Misuari still has the predominant following
in the field and the most prominent leadership status in the Muslim region. However,
if he persists on maintaining his hard line demand for secession, he could lose the
support of both the International Islamic community and large parts of the Movement
who are prepared to negotiate for a more realistic solution to the Moro problem.
68 Abat, Fortunato., Op. Cit., p. 13.
69 Ibid., p. 47.
71 Ibid., p. 91.
72 Ibid., p. 100.
73 Ibid., pp. 108-110.
74/Wrf.,p. 109
75 Ibid., pp. 119-121.
76 Stockwin, Harvey , " Jolo: A Man-Made Disaster," Far Eastern Economic Review,
25 February 1974, pp. 10-11.
77 See, "The Changing face of death," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 September
1974, pp. 38-40.
78 Würfel, David, "Southeast Asian Alignments," International journal, Volume 29,
No.3, Summer, 1974, p. 452.
79 Stockwin, H., "Marcos gain fame from the Muslims," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 8 July 1974, pp. 10-11.
80 Abat, Fortunato, Op. cit., p. 158.
81 Stockwin, Harvey, Op. Gt., p. 12.
82 Ronquillo, Bernardino, "The Muslims: Marcos turns to economics," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 28 February 1975, p. 27.
83 May, R. J.,and Nemenzo, Francisco, The Philippines After Marcos, Billing & Sons
Ltd, Worcester, 1985, p. 113.
84 Ronquillo,Bernardino, Op. Cit.,p. 27.
85 May and Nemenzo, Op. Cit., p. 114.
87 Wideman, Bernard, "All Aboard Marcos' Peace Special," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 2 May 1975, p. 18.
88 Stauffer, Robert B., "Philippine Autoritarianism: Framework for Peripheral
Development," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1977, p. 386.
89 Wideman, Bernard, "An Approach to the Muslim rebels," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 22 November 1974, p. 12.
90 Tasker, Rodney, "The Moro Rebellion, Who calls the shots?" Far Eastern
Economic Review, 14 January 1977, p. 20.
91 Tasker, Rodney, "The Battle is on for peace," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3
December 1976, pp. 8-9.
92 Ibid., p. 9.
93 Tasker, Rodney, "The Moro Rebellion, Who calls the shots?" Far Eastern
Economic Review, 14 January 1977 pp. 18-20.
94 Tasker, Rodney, "Rebel's resolve puts the heat on Marcos," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 31 December 1976, p. 9.
95 Tasker, Rodney, "Marcos moves closer to a Southern peace," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 7 January 1977, pp. 24-25.
96 Ibid., p. 25.
97 Ibid., p. 28.
98 Tasker, Rodney, "Plebiscite for the South," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25
February 1977, p. 23.
99 Tasker, Rodney, "A step back to the battlefield," Far Eastern Economic Review,
11 March 1977, pp. 9-10.
100 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
101 Tasker, Rodney, "Uneasy peace after the plebiscite," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 29 April 1977, p. 10.
102 Tasker, Rodney, "Peace gets another Chance," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3
June 1977, p. 8.
103 Tasker, Rodney, "Zamboanga waits and worries," Far Eastern Economic Review,
28 October 1977, p. 14.
104 Ocampo, Sheilah , "Renewed Opposition," Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May
1982, p. 12.
105 See, "Marcos talks of change," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 November
1977, p. 24.
106 Tasker, Rodney, "A Showpiece faces scepticism," Far Eastern Economic Review,
11 May 1979, pp. 18-19.
107 Ocampo, Sheilah, "Why the 'water banker' stood," Far Eastern Economic Review,
18 May 1979, pp. 20-21.
108 Tasker, Rodney, "Tightrope test for Marcos," Far Eastern Economic Review, 21
January 1977, p. 13.
109 Tasker, Rodney, "Marcos' peace manoeuvres," Far Eastern Economic Review,
28 January 1977, p. 13.
110 May and Nemenzo, Op. cit., p. 120.
111 Ocampo, Sheilah, "Calling in the neighbors," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8
February 1980, p. 19.
112 Tiglao, Rigoberto, "Hidden Strength," Far Eastern Economic Review, 23
February 1995, p. 22.
113 Tasker, Rodney, "An Islamic Boost for the Rebels, " Far Eastern Economic
Review, 8 June 1979, p. 38.
114 May and Nemenzo, Op. cit., p. 120.
115 Tasker, Rodney, "Calm on the Moro Front," Far Eastern Economic Review, 9
August 1984, p. 30.
116 Bunge, Frederica, Op. Cit., p. 292.
117 Kamaludddin, S. and Tasker, Rodney, "Pressing the Point," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 22 December 1983, p. 26.
