The February 1986 "People's revolution" ousted President Marcos from power
and Corazon Aquino was sworn in as the next President. Corazon Aquino is the widow
of the late former Senator Benigno Aquino, the political archrival of Marcos, who was assassinated at the Manüa International Airport in August 1983. Upon her assumption
to office, President Aquino granted amnesty and released a number of political prisoners.
The amnesty was part of a confidence building gesture to pursue her reconciliation
program with all sectors of society.
Intense diplomacy coming from Southeast Asian capitals and the Middle East
prompted President Aquino's decision to meet MNLF chairman Nur Misuari early in her
term. The Aquino family's private links to Misuari also played a key role in bringing
him back to a meeting with the President after 13 years of exile. The relationship date
back to the 1970s when members of an anti-Marcos "Sandiean army" connected to
Agapito "Butz" Aquino's Philippine Democratic Socialist Party, reportedly received
weapons-training in MNLF camps in Sabah. Butz Aquino is President Aquino's brotherin-
law. Butz Aquino maintained communication with Misuari during the whole period
of the Marcos regime. The slain husband of the President, former Senator Benigno
Aquino was also reported to have made two trips to Saudi Arabia, before his tragic
death, to meet Misuari. His purpose was to act as mediator between MNLF and
Manila.118
In mid-August 1986, Misuari was confirmed to visit the island of Jolo to attend
a "Second National Bangsa Moro Congress," scheduled on 2-5 September. Seizing the
opportunity, President Aquino announced her dramatic gesture of meeting Misuari during
or after the congress, in Jolo or possibly in nearby Zamboanga City.119
1. The Aquino-Misuari Meeting
Setting aside protocol, President Aquino met with Nur Misuari on 5 September
in a Roman Catholic convent in Jolo under stringent security. This historic meeting led
to an agreement between the government and the MNLF providing for the cessation of
hostilities. More importantly, it laid the ground work for formal discussions aimed at finding a political rather than a military solution to the conflict in Southern Philippines.
Aquino and Misuari agreed on the continuation of informal, localized cease-fire accords
between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the MNLF and that these would
be formalized. The negotiating timetable called for the initial consolidation of the agreed
cessation of hostilities. This would be followed by substantive talks that would start
when both sides had selected their negotiating panels. Peace negotiations were to be
carried out under the auspices of the OIC. A joint statement named AFP Brigadier
General Jose Magno and MNLF intelligence chief Abdul Sahrin as the first panelists,
concentrating on military matters. Named civilian coordinators were the president's
brother-in-law, Agapito "Butz" Aquino and Sharif Jain Jale, a moderate Muslim from
Zamboanga.120
Although local commanders of the Dimas Pundato (Reformist) and the Hashim
Salamat (Fundamentalist) factions of the MNLF had, as early as April, signed cease-fire
agreements with military authorities of the AFP Regional Unified Command 12, peace
in Mindanao, continued to be unstable. Cases of warring Muslim groups and power
politics caused the uneasy situation in the area.
There was wide belief that President Aquino committed a tactical error by
resuscitating Misuari, who no longer commanded the respect of the Muslims. Defense
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile said on 18 October 1986 in Zamboanga City that President
Aquino had unnecessarily rekindled the Philippine Muslim separatist problem by agreeing
to meet MNLF chairman Nur Misuari in September.121
2. The Jeddah Accord
In furtherance of the initial agreement between President Aquino and Nur
Misuari, government negotiator National Affairs Minister Aquilino Pimentel and MNLF
leader Nur Misuari signed an autonomy agreement in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 4 January 1987. The accord proposed to grant autonomy to all of Mindanao and the island
provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Sulu and Palawan "subject to democratic processes."
The words 'democratic processes' refer to the results of the 2 February plebiscite to
ratify a draft constitution that contained provisions to grant autonomy to parts of the
country. The other "democratic process" is the need for a stamp of approval by a future
Philippine legislature and the holding of a plebiscite. In signing the agreement, Misuari
has indicated that he abandoned his bid for a separate Muslim state and accepted instead
a form of autonomy within the Philippines.122
While the agreement might have placated Misuari, it drew resentment from the
other MNLF splinter groups. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) reacted
sharply at being sidelined in the negotiations and to show its displeasure, conducted
coordinated attacks on bridges and government buildings. National Affairs Minister
Aquilino Pimentel quickly patched up the problem by concluding a temporary cease-fire
with Haji Murad, the deputy leader of the MILF on 18 January. In reaction to the
violent resentment of the MILF, the government changed its policy toward the conduct
of peace negotiations with the rebels. Pimentel later announced that the peace panel
would include all important groups in Mindanao, Christian or Muslim, to discuss a
comprehensive peace for the troubled island. Besides the violent reaction of the MILF,
a growing backlash by the Christian majority against Manila's emphasis on the Muslim
dimension of the island's problem might have triggered the government turnaround.123
3. The 1987 Peace Talks
A 26-point demand submitted by Chief MNLF panelist Habib Hashim to Chief
government negotiator Emmanuel Pelaez on 20 February 1987, revolved around the
creation of a "semi-parliamentary" Bangsa Moro Autonomous Region (BMAR) headed by a "chief minister" and three deputy chief ministership coming from representatives
of the Christian, Muslim and tribal communities. The chief minister heads a 16-member
cabinet and has the power to appoint senior civil servants. He and his government
would serve appointed terms until 1992- and there after face elections. The MNLF
claimed that the Philippine Government had already agreed to grant full autonomy to the
23 provinces mentioned in the proposal.124
The government maintained that it had agreed only to continue discussion of the
proposal, subject to the proviso that any final agreement would be subjected to
"democratic processes." It insisted that the proposal of the MNLF is contrary to the
Jeddah Accord. By mid-April, the MNLF retreated from its 23 province demand to just
13 provinces and for the other 10 provinces to be the subject of plebiscite. Pelaez
initially welcomed the shift but after consulting with the President, he reported on 21
April that the government would not budge on plebiscite and constitutional procedure.
As the 9 May expiration of the MNLF-govemment cease-fire agreement loomed, both
sides tried feverishly to arrive at a mutually agreeable arrangement on the autonomy
issue. The government rejected MNLF notions to use Aquino's residual decree-making
powers to create a Bangsa Moro Autonomous Region (BMAR) of at least 13 provinces.
The Government could not accede to the MNLF demands, noting that the Constitution
and the Jeddah Accord do not sanction the steps suggested. Culpable violation of the
Constitution would have exposed Aquino to possible impeachment. Consequently, the
peace talks collapsed and the Moro insurgency remained unresolved.125
4. Developments After the 1987 Peace Talks
Despite breakdown of the talks, the Government pursued its Constitutional
mandate to form an autonomous region in Southern Philippines. The Mindanao Regional Consultative Commission (MRCC) was organized and tasked to help Congress in drafting
an "Organic act" for the proposed autonomous region. The Office of the Peace
Commissioner (OPC) supervised the formation of the MRCC. The OPC, with the
Mindanao Consensus Building Panel, evolved a selection process that sought fair and
adequate representation of all affected sectors. From an initial list of nominees, the
President personally interviewed and selected the 52 MRCC Commissioners.
The MRCC was officially constituted on 26 March 1987. Besides the usual
plenary sessions, the Commissioners held a series of consultations with their constituents
to ensure that the draft organic act duly reflected their aspirations. The MRCC
leadership submitted to Congress an unfinished working document in October. The body
was not able to reach consensus on key aspects of the organic act in the time allotted to
them. Only eight articles reached second reading. None of the provisions however,
reached a third and final reading. Despite its drawbacks, the Executive Branch duly
recognized the significance of the MRCC document. Many provisions reflect the
aspirations of the various sectors in the region. Later, Congress used the MRCC output
as a valuable input in formulating the organic act for the autonomous region in Southern
Philippines.
5. Dismissal of Dimasangcay Pundato as head of MNLF-RG
The MNLF-RG tried to realign with the MNLF and MILF during the talks
between the Aquino Government and the Nur Misuari faction. The Reformist group was
hoping to gain national recognition and to initiate the formation of a broader political
base. The Reformist group however, was accused of having betrayed the Muslim rebel
movement for participating in government reconciliation programs in the region.
Pundato's appointment as Executive director of the Office of Muslim Affairs
(OMA) on 27 October 1988 led to his dismissal as head of the MNLF-Reformist Group.
Despite his dismissal, Pundato continued to advance the interest of the Muslims. His
program at the Office of Muslim Affairs gave priority to institution building,
organizational development and community building. Emphasis was given to the
enhancement and institutionalization of Madarasah, Shariah, Islamic financial institutions, pilgrimages, endowments and even Quran readings. Agricultural and small business
cooperatives, adult education and functional literacy programs and human resources
developments in the Muslim sector were also of great interest to the OMA.
6. The Organic Act of 1989
In August 1989, an organic act offering significant autonomy for Mindanao
became part of the law of the land. A plebiscite held in November decided which of
Mindanao's thirteen provinces and nine major cities would join the autonomous region.
Nur Misuari rejected the plebiscite as a violation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. He
urged the five million Muslims to boycott it, and threatened to reignite his armed struggle
for independence. Despite Misuari's threats, the plebiscite was relatively peaceful and
voter turnout was moderate. As expected, only four provinces with Muslim majorities
voted to join the autonomous region.126
The four Muslim-dominated provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao and
Lanao del Sur composed the new Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
Elections for a regional governor, vice governor and a 21-man legislative assembly
followed the holding of the plebiscite. The election was set the following February.
Zacaria Candao won the seat for regional governor of the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) on February 1989. As regional governor, Candao's
initial thrust was the laying of the foundations for the ARMM while on the side he tried
to find ways to surmount intertribal differences, mediate in family feuds, and raise more
money for his badly depleted treasury. Given the way intertribal rivalry led to a degree
of fragmentation within the Muslim secessionist MNLF, observers expected conflicts
between the Tausugs from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, the Maguindanaos and the Maranaos
from Lanao del Sur, to remain near the surface in the new administration. There was
some effort to strike a balance in the regional autonomous government. Candao is a
Maguindanao, while vice-governor Ben Loong and assembly speaker vice-governor Ismael Abubakar are both Tausugs. The rest of the autonomous government comprises
three representatives from Tawi-Tawi, and six each from Sulu, Lanao del Sur and
Maguindanao.
Although the MNLF rejected the new organic act and the result of the plebiscite,
it decided to respect an informal truce forged after the cancellation of the peace talks.
The MNLF instead embarked on an aggressive diplomatic campaign to gain international
recognition to its cause. In particular, it targeted the influential Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) for its campaign for recognition. It made a bid for full membership
in the body. When the MNLF first submitted its application, the OIC turned it down.
It expects to renew its bid in succeeding OIC meetings.
118 Clad, James, "The Misuari Gamble," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11
September 1986, p. 18.
119 Ibid., p. 18.
120 Ibid., p. 24.
121 Villegas, Bernardo M., "The Philippines in 1986," Asian Survey, Vol XXVH, No.
2, February 1987, p. 197.
122 Clad, James, "Autonomy and Acrimony," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15
January, 1987, p. 17.
123 Clad, James, "Delivering a warning," Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 January
1987, pp. 22-23.
124 Clad, James,"Dampening demands," Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 April 1987,
p. 28.
125 Clad, James, "Peace talk with Moros stalled," Far Eastern Economic Review, 7
May 1987, p. 28.
126 Timberman, David G., "The Philippines in 1989," Asian Survey, Vol. XXX, No.
2, February 1990, p. 170.
