THE RISE OF STUDENT ACTIVISM IN THE 1960s
The worldwide phenomenon of student activism and the influence of the cultural
revolution in China reached and made considerable influence on the Philippines in the
mid 1960s. Marxist inspired students and workers conducted radical protest activities
that became a frequent occurrence in the streets of Manila. Muslim students studying
there were caught up in them, raising their political, economic and social awareness.
Worldwide resurgence of Islam also occurred during this period and contacts made by
the Filipino Muslim students with the international Islamic community added to their
political maturity. The student protest activities in Manila against the Marcos regime
gradually influenced the thinking of Muslim students. Their focus of discontent shifted
from the Christian sector of the Filipino society to that of the administration of President
Marcos itself. The perception that the government was siding with the Christians in the
simmering Muslim-Christian conflict, and the failure to resolve the growing social,
economic and political problems that caused earlier clashes between rival armed gangs
of Christian and Muslim communities, further reinforced the discontent against the
Marcos government. Moving a step down the political structure, the Muslim students
and intellectuals were also disenchanted with the political dishonesty and corruption of
the traditional Muslim leaders, the datus and the traditional politicians. Many of these
young Muslim students and intellectuals became Marxist-inspired and formed their own
clandestine group to initiate change. Nur Misuari provided the leadership for the young
Muslims. Misuari is a Muslim idealist who until June 1972 was a faculty member of the
Asian Center at the University of the Philippines in Manila.45
THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAM
The resurgence of Islam flows from a regained self-confidence by countries in the
Middle East. This was a result of the material wealth derived from oil resources that
these countries have been blessed with. The main thrust of the Muslim revival centered on Islam as a focus of identity, a universal faith-culture that encompasses two continents
and brought together 600 million followers. The mounting tide of Islam coincided with
the Third World state of mind of admiration/hatred of the West and of disillusionment
with modernization. Revival of an international Islamic identity as an alternative to other
blocs and groupings throughout the world and a domestic Muslim revival to influence
national policies are two developments that can be identified with the rise of Islam.
The international gathering of Muslim leaders in Rabat in 1969, initiated by King
Faisal of Saudi Arabia gave impetus to the revival of Islam. The meeting of the leaders
caused the formation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The summit
conference in 1969 had a widespread impact on the Islamic world at large. The media
carried news and pictures of Muslim leaders embracing each other in disregard of their
traditional rifts and jealousies, giving the impression of a truly universal Muslim
brotherhood.46
Following the Rabat conference, Muammar Qaddafi, the young, visionary, fanatic
and imaginative leader of a military coup succeeded in his bid for power in Libya.
Catapulted to international prominence, Qaddafi emphasized the trend towards the
predominance of Islam in domestic and international policies of Islamic nations.
Qaddafi's Islamic neo-puritanism at home, coupled with his aggressive religious zeal
abroad, made him a very important political figure, especially as his power was backed
with large oil resources. Moreover, he saw himself as the arbiter of all the Islamic
countries. He encouraged believers to return to the strict standards of early Islam.47
Qaddafi's anti-colonial stance led him to support dissident or revolutionary
movements, particularly Muslim movements, that were fighting established reactionary
regimes. Support comes in the form of weapons, funds and training. He was also
believed to have supported the training and equipment requirements of terrorist groups like the Palestinians and the Irish Republican Army.
In the Philippines, Islamic resurgence has taken strongest root in the proliferation
of Islamic schools known as madrasah. In the past there were few sources of instruction
in Islamic traditions. With the resurgence of Islam, mosques were built in every
barangay, and every mosque had its madrasah. Most of the madrasah supplemented
rather than replaced conventional Western education, with students attending on the
weekends to study Arabic, Islamic history and law, the Koran and ethics. The madrasahs
contributed to the Filipino Muslims awareness towards the Islamic faith. Muslim elites
emerged seeking autonomy and the right to apply Islamic values to the traditional Muslim
areas in the south. There was also a growing desire to identify themselves with the
wider Muslim umma or worldwide Islamic community.
BIRTH OF THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
It was initially under the auspices of the Mindanao Independence Movement that
Muslim rebels were sent to Malaysia to undergo military training starting in 1969. The
rebels received training in guerilla warfare, intelligence and counterintelligence,
demolition, automatic firing and jungle survival from Malaysian officers. Most of the
early trainees were Marxists inspired Muslim students who became disillusioned with the
traditional Muslim leadership and organization. They saw the need to form a more
aggressive organization to effect change.
It was in one of the training sites in Pulau Pangkor, an island off the coast of
West Malaysia's Perak state, that the Moro National Liberation Front was formed in
1969. Its avowed objective is to form a separate state called the Bangsa Moro Republik
(BMR), comprising the islands of Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan.48
The MNLF is an expression of Muslim opposition to the government land policy
in the south perceived as an enforced Christianization of Moroland. It was also a
response to the steady erosion of Muslim political power and to the economic discrimination suffered in the hands of the local Christian sector.
The core of MNLF leaders came from five principal batches of Pulau Pangkor
trainees between 1969 and 1970. The lower ranking members of the organization
received training in camps in Sabah. The rebels came from basically three groups:
Maguindanaos in Cotabato, Maranaos in the two Lanao provinces, and the Tausogs in
Sulu, Basilan and the coastal areas of Zamboanga del Sur. Recruits are given six months
of military training and political education before they join the regular field units.49
The MNLF has parallel political and military structures. The political arm consists
of a central committee of twenty members, a political bureau, a propaganda and
intelligence bureau, and provincial and barrio committees. The political organization was
a coalition of traditional and conservative Muslim elite and the Marxist inspired young
radicals. Through the organization, the traditional elites got a vehicle to maintain political
power, while the young radicals gained legitimation from the credentials of the
former.50
The Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) provided the military arm of the
organization. It is headed by a field-marshal who is under the central committee but not
directly supervised by it. There are also field-marshals at the provincial level and zone
commanders at the municipality level.51
FOREIGN SUPPORT TO THE REBELS
The rebels started receiving foreign monetary aid as early as 1969. Funds were
initial given to the MEM through the older Muslim leaders like former Congressman
Rascid Lucman. While openly under the MEM, Nur Misuari covertly built up his own
organization. He used the money he received to finance the formation of the Bangsa Moro Army that later became the military arm of the MNLF. When the MIM leadership
found that he was operating not under the auspices of the MIM but as MNLF Chairman,
a split in the relationship followed and monetary support to the latter was cut off. 52
Misuari sent representatives to Malaysia to convince the Malaysians of the
legitimacy of the objectives of the MNLF and to resume monetary support directly to
his organization. Two sets of delegations sent to Malaysia produced negative results.
The Malaysians wanted Misuari to patch up his differences with Lucman and the older
Muslim leaders. They also wanted him to go to Sabah and explain what happened.
After two trips, Misuari convinced the Malaysians that his organization represented a
united front against the government. Aid to the rebels resumed after that.
Lucman at first tried to reestablish control over the secessionist movement, calling
for an independent Islamic state and denigrating the communist character of Misuari's
MNLF, the Bangsa Moro Army (Moro People's Army) and the goal of establishing a
Moro People's Republik. Failing to wrest back the rebel movement from Misuari,
Lucman laid down his arms and got an amnesty from President Marcos.53
The man responsible for Malaysian support to the Filipino Muslim rebels was Tun
Datu Haji Mustapha, the Chief Minister of Sabah. He was born in Sulu and had several
relatives in elective positions there. He was also a guerilla fighter in Jolo during the
Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War Two.54
Mustapha earned the friendship of most of the Muslim rulers in the Middle East, most especially King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi by his demonstrated religious zeal in converting the natives and the Chinese in Sabah to Islam. As Secretary General of the OIC he endorsed the Moro case submitted to him in 1972 and asked King Faisal and President Qaddafi to help persuade other OIC member states to support it.55
Mustapha provided aid to the rebels and allowed the use of Sabah as training
camp, supply depot, communication center and sanctuary. He let the rebels acquire
motor boats in Sabah for smuggling of arms and ammunition to their forces in Mindanao
and for bringing back rebel casualties for treatment in Sabah. He supplied the rebels
with arms and money, either on his own or as a conduit for Colonel Qaddafi. Mustapha
believed that by helping the Muslims in the Southern Philippines, he was helping his
people. Many Muslims however believed that he decided to support the rebels only after
the Philippines laid formal claim to Sabah in the early 1960s, an act that led the two
countries to break diplomatic relations twice.56
The Malaysian Government in Kuala Lumpur strenuously denied that it was
supporting the Muslim rebels. Not wanting to alienate Malaysia, the Philippine
government accepted the assurance of the Malaysian Government. However, Kuala
Lumpur may not have the full control over the activities of Tun Mustapha at that time.
Evidence has subsequently been quoted to suggest that he had ambitions for a state of his
own whose nucleus would be Sabah, Sulu and Mindanao. There may be some truth to
this because Sabah's relationship with Malaysia was up for review in 1973.57
Libya supplied money and arms to the rebels in the belief that the Philippine
Government had embarked on a programme of genocide. The Libyan leader Muammar
Qaddafi was said to have decided to intervene in the south after hearing a radio program
on Muslim problems there. He ordered arms and money to be supplied after asking his
aides: "Where exactly is Cotabato?" In 1972, Misuari and several established Muslim
politicians of the south visited Libya to arrange the flow of support to the rebels.
Representations made to channel arms and funds through Sulawesi or Kalimantan were
rejected by the Indonesian government. This left Sabah as the only conduit for foreign aid from the Middle East.58
The first shipment of firearms from Sabah landed in December 1972 at the town
of Lebak in Cotabato province. Boats, each powered with three Volvo-Penta 170
engines, brought in Belgian made Cal 7.62 rifles, anti-personnel mines, grenades of the
cylindrical unserrated type, plastic explosives, Cal 30 LMG, Browning carbines, Cal 30
Mis and several thousand rounds of ammunition to Cotabato and other landing sites
regularly for the next fourteen months.59
In contrast to the Libyan zeal, Southeast Asian governments maintained a low
profile with regards to the Mindanao crisis. There were deep concerns in Jakarta and
Kuala Lumpur that, just when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was
making some headway in different but important areas, it seems to have fallen into the
old destructive rut. Both governments maintained that the crisis was an internal affair
of the Philippines.
MNLF LEADERSHIP
According to one account, the original five members of the MNLF were Nur
Misuari, Abul Khayr Alonto, Indar Tampi, Amelil Malaquiok (Commander Ronnie), and
another Muslim from Zamboanga- two Tausug/Samal, two Maranao, and one
Maguindanaoan. On the other hand Jamil Lucman claimed that there were ten founders
of the MNLF. He identified the founders as: Nur Misuari, Jamail Lucman, Abul Khayr
Alonto, Amelil Malaquiok, Al Bandaing, Sali Wali, Utu Salajuddin, Ali Boon, Abdul
Manan, and Akman Inampala. The last four had already been killed.60
The recognized leader and chairman of the central committee is Nur Misuari. He
is a Tausug from the Sulu archipelago. He was a prominent member of the Kabataan
Makabavan (Nationalist Youth) founded by Jose Maria Sison in 1964. The Kabataan
Makabayan was a Marxist-inspired organization that draw membership from students and
ideologues. Sison went on to form the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on 26
December 1968, and this served as a model for Misuari in organizing the MNLF.
Misuari and his wife, Desdemona Tan, who was from a prominent Chinese family in
Sulu, were based in the Middle East.
The vice-chairman, who remained in Mindanao, was Abul Khayr Alonto. He is
a member of a prominent Lanao Maranao family. He was a former law student at San
Beda College in Manila and won the vice-mayorship of Marawi City in the 1971
elections. Abhoud Syed Lingga served as the Front's spokesman to journalists when he
chaired the political secretariat in northern Mindanao. He was later removed from
office. Hashim Salamat, a Maguindanao, chaired the foreign affair's committee and
served as the Front's spokesman abroad. Abdulhamid Lukman, a former municipal
judge at Maimbung, Sulu, served as Salamat's deputy until he defected in August 1975.
Abdul Baki, a Tausug living in the Middle East, also served as spokesman of the
Front.61
The MNLF leadership tried to develop an ideology that gave emphasis to "Moro"
nationalism and social reform to obtain both foreign Islamic support and the support of
the local Muslim community. It is this objective expressed in Marxist phraseology that
led to the early falling out between the young intellectual leadership of the MNLF and
traditional Muslim leaders.
THE DOMESTIC FRONT
At the outset, the MNLF had to form its own fighting units in the provinces of
Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan, and Sulu,
independent of the other rebel groups. They had to show that their units were better
organized, disciplined and dedicated than the other groups. These attributes did not pass
unnoticed so when the MNLF sounded off a call for unity, many decided to join. Other
rebel groups joined the MNLF but retained their own independent identity. The rebel
movement grew in size under the leadership of the MNLF. It turned out to be a more
disciplined successor to the Mindanao Independence Movement. Through its military
arm, the Bangsa Moro Army, rebellion began within a month after the declaration of
'martial law'. The rebels waged a furious war against central authority and during the
next year the Armed Forces of the Philippines had to struggle desperately to restore
control.
The uprising was not connected with the imposition of Martial law in September
1972. However, rebel propaganda tried to portray Martial law as a government tool to
forcibly integrate and Christianize the Muslims. Their own propaganda aroused their
fighting spirit. The rebels rallied the Muslims to their cause by declaring "jihad."
The rebels used classic guerilla tactics of encircling the urban centers and isolating
them from the other areas by cutting and controlling the roads. They made good use of
ambush and withdrawal and of surprise and mobility. Unlike the army, their intelligence
is good. Their targets are visible while they are not. They have a vital underground
supplementary force in their sympathizers, whom the Armed Forces cannot isolate. They
knew the terrain and exploited it to their strategic advantage. What distinguishes the war
from previous small scale encounters between dissidents and the constabulary was that
for the first time it seemed relatively organized. The rebels had communication
equipment and there was a unified command, at least in each area.62
The Grand Design to Independence
The Cotabato operation of the MNLF was the pivotal point for the rebellion. The
rebel planned to use Cotabato as the main logistical base for foreign support. This initially required clearing the province of government forces. The Cotabato Command
would later link up with the Davao Command and drive through the Agusan corridor to
the Surigao provinces in the east. Meanwhile, a task force from the Cotabato Command
would push toward Bukidnon while the Lanao Command will push toward Misamis
Oriental. Zamboanga MNLF command would take over Misamis Occidental, while
Basilan/Jolo MNLF would take over the whole of the Sulu archipelago to include the
province of Palawan.63
Datu Ali Sansaluna was the leader of 5000-6000 men that composed the
MNLF Cotabato Command. Two thousand of his men were armed with powerful
weapons of European make. The rebels selected Lebak as their logistical base because
of the advantages of terrain. The coastline and the Tran and Tran Peidu rivers provided
excellent entry points for the landing of arms and ammunition and other war material
coming from abroad. Tran river provided the natural obstacle to any planned enemy
incursion into the fortified area. The sea provided an easy avenue of withdrawal. From
Lebak, the MNLF distributed war material that arrived from abroad, to units in the
central plains of Cotabato.64
The encounter between the MNLF Cotabato Command and a Philippine
Constabulary patrol on 27 February 1973, signaled the offensive against AFP
detachments all over Cotabato. The Cotabato Command easily neutralized government
forces in the central plains of Cotabato. Land traffic from Cotabato City to Davao City,
General Santos City and to Parang where the command center of the Fourth Philippine
Constabulary Zone headquarters was located, was cut off by the rebels. This severely
affected the security and economic situation in the area. The rebels aimed to capture the
Cotabato City-Awang Airport complex as the last phase of the Cotabato operations before
moving on to the next stage of their plan.
Facing the rebel onslaught were the 27th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army, the 54th Philippine Constabulary Battalion and the PC Provincial
Commands. After the blitz-like operations of the MNLF in the province of Cotabato,
the rebels occupied/controlled/ influenced the towns of Tumbao, Datu Piang, Buluan,
Sultan sa Barongis, Ampatuan, a part of Columbio, Maganoy except its poblacion,
Dinaig, a large part of Nuling, Upi and Lebak except for a foothold in the shoreline
compound of the Magsaysay Logging Company. Cotabato City and the Awang airport
complex were practically surrounded by MNLF occupied/controlled/influenced areas.65
The rebels intensified the ambush of military convoys and attacks on
isolated communities and inadequately defended government outposts and bridge
defenses. They are by this time able to mount attacks up to battalion in size. The
MNLF leadership assumed that the Marcos government can only be forced to make
significant concessions by a combination of a war of attrition and diplomatic pressure.
The Bangsa Moro Army however, committed the mistake of trying to
hold-territory against the government forces who had superior fire power and logistics
back-up. As a result of a flawed strategy, the rebels suffered major losses. Thereafter,
the rebels changed their strategy in favor of guerilla warfare and 'mass work'. Rebel
activity fell into a pattern where escalation of the armed conflict normally precedes the
meetings of the Organization of Islamic Conference. In between conferences of the OIC,
rebel initiated armed conflict tend to subside.
THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT
By the first quarter of 1974, the MNLF succeeded in getting the attention of the
Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers. As a result, MNLF representatives were
invited to attend the Kuala Lumpur summit in June 1974. Two documents presented by
the rebel delegation to the Conference, asked for recognition and support in their struggle for an independent Muslim state in Southern Philippines.66
The rebels were not able to get what they wanted for the foreign ministers' in
their communique called for "a political and peaceful solution . . . within the framework
of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines." What the rebels
gained in the conference was the specific recognition of the MNLF as the representative
of Muslim Filipinos. It also got an explicit description of the socioeconomic plan of the
Philippine government to address the problem in the south which it found inadequate.67
The MNLF embarked on an aggressive diplomatic campaign to gain international
recognition to its cause. In particular, it targeted the influential Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) for its campaign for recognition. It made a bid for full membership
in the body. When the MNLF first submitted its application, the OIC turned it down.
In succeeding conferences of the OIC, the MNLF continued to apply for permanent
membership, and every time, the conferees failed to consider the application. Apparently
the OIC is wary that this would set a precedent for other Muslim secessionist movements
in other countries. Although the MNLF has not achieved membership in the OIC, it has
gained the support of the Organization into mediating into the conflict. The involvement
of the OIC has prevented the Philippine Government from using an all out military
solution to solve the problem in the south.
45 Ibid., p. 25.
46 Israeli, Raphael, "The New Wave of Islam." International Journal, Volume 34,
No. 3, Summer 1979, pp. 369-377.
"Ibid.,?. 375.
48 in "Who's backing the Muslim rebels?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March
1974, p. 12.
49 Ibid., p. 13.
50 Malloy, Ivan, "Revolution in the Philippines, The Question of An Alliance
Between Islam and Communism," Asian Survey, Vol. XXV, No. 8, August 1985, p.
856.
51 Noble, Lela, Op. at., p. 412.
52 Ibid, p. 410.
53 See, "Who's backing the rebels," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March 1974,
p. 13.
54 Stockwin,H., "Marcos' Vietnam?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 March 1973,
pp. 15-16.
55 Samad, and Abu Bakar, Op. cit., p. 560.
56 Ibid., pp. 558-559.
57 Turpin, Alex, "New Society's Challenge in the Philippines," p. 9.
58 Stowe, Judy, Op. cit., p. 26.
59 See "Who's backing the Muslim rebels," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March
1973, p. 13.
60 Noble,Lela G.,"Muslim Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of
a Stalemate," Asian Survey, Vol. XXI , No. 11, November 1981, p. 1113.
61 Noble, Lela G., Op. at., pp. 412-413.
62 Brian, Phelan., "Spectre of Jihad," Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 May 1993,
p. 29.
63 Abat, Fortunate, The Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao, SBA Printers Inc, Quezon
City, p. xx.
64 Ibid., p. xx.
65 Ibid., p. 47.
